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ANDREW J. MILLER*

Transferable Development Rights
in the Constitutional Landscape:
Has Penn Central Failed to Weather
the Storm?
ABSTRACT

Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) are a flexible marketbased tool that allows land planners to overcome many of the
shortcomingsassociatedwith traditionalzoning practices.A TDR
program works by designatinga "sending" zone where development is restricted in exchange for the right to "transfer" that
development to a "receiving" zone. Receiving zones areareas where
development is permitted with the purchase ofdevelopment rights
(TDRs)from a sending zone. The value of TDRs is decided by the
market. TDRs can have many positive land management impacts,
but must be developed within the constitutionalconstraintsof the
Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This articleargues that TDRs
may be attacked under the Fifth Amendment in two ways. First,
developers required to purchase TDRs may challenge them as
unconstitutional exactions. Such challenges are rare but pose
potentiallyserious threats to TDR programs, especially in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions limiting the government's power
to impose exactions. This article constructs a framework under
which landmanagersmay avoid such challenges. Second, landowners who have development restricted in exchange for TDRs may
challenge the restrictionsas a regulatory taking. These challenges
are more common and courts have used two very different types of
analysis in dealing with them. One approach treats TDRs as an
economic use of the land and factors their value into the takings
calculus. A second approach performs the takings calculus independent of TDRs and only considers TDRs as a form of just
compensation where a taking has occurred. This articleargues that
the latter approachis more convincing theoreticallyand will better
protect environmental resources, maximize TDR values, and
assurefair and equitable treatment of landowners. As a result,
market participantswill have increasedconfidence in TDR market
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integrity. Finally, this article briefly addresses the outdatednature
of Supremea the
Court
precedent
TDR constitutionality and
suggests
Court
revisit theonissue
to clarfy its approach and
practices.
provide analysis
more consistent
with modern takings
landismanagement
andthat
jurisprudence
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination,
the affections of mankind, as the right of
and engages
property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.
William Blackstone'
In 1978 the Supreme Court, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York Cit, 2 first addressed a takings claim involving transferable
development rights (TDRs). Penn Central owned the historic Grand Central
3 Under
Terminal and several surrounding properties in New York City.was
proNew York City's Landmarks Preservation Law, Penn Central
the terminal, but was given
hibited from developing the air space above
TDRs that would allow development of air space over surrounding
held that Penn
properties it owned.4 In a landmark decision the Court
Central had not suffered an unconstitutional taking. Since the decision in
Penn Central, the Court has writen extensively on the takings issue,
shaping a new landscape of takings jurisprudence. At the same time,
modern TDR programs have evolved well beyond the scheme interpreted
by the Court in 1978. Moder TDR programs are quickly f ing a place
alongside other innovative land management tools and are being used to
protect increasingly diverse and widespread resources. As a result, these
newer programs rarely resemble the simple TDR scheme used in Penn
Central In 1997, in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency,s the Supreme
Court momentarily approached the issue of TDRs again. Although the
Court never reached a decision on the constitutionality of TDRs under the
Takings Clause, Justice Scalia, joined by two other Justices, wrote an
important concurrence to the majority's opinion that did discuss the
constitutional aspects of TDRs and revisited an old approach to evaluating

1.

PsnwERsW

INPROPRRT'Y LAW (Robert C. Ellickson, et aL. ads., 1995) (quoting 2

WILLAM BLAcK5TONE, CoMETsmARIES "2).
2. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
3. See id.at 115.

4. See id. at 114.

5. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'iPlanning Agency, 520 US. 725(1997).

Summer 19991

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

them. Scalia's opinion re-emphasizes the ambiguous nature of the Court's
first interlude with TDRs and raises concerns about the applicability of
Penn Centralto modem TDR programs.
In the current context Penn Centralmay not be protecting landowners' rights sufficiently and may be undermining landowner confidence in
TDR markets. In addition, the takings landscape crafted by the Court in the
last 20 years presents concerns for TDR programs that did not exist when
Penn Centralwas decided. Consequently, TDR programs must be aware of
new types of takings challenges and the Court must realize that it may be
time to abandon Penn Central in search of a better approach to the TDR
issue. As TDRs are incorporated with increasing frequency into regional
land management plans,6 their constitutionality is an issue the Court will
likely be forced to approach once again. The outcome will have farreaching and significant effects on private property rights and natural
resource conservation alike.
The first part of this article discusses several introductory
principles of TDRs and gives a brief background on their use in modem
land management. The second part discusses the legal identity of TDRs.
Initially, the legal identity of TDRs is established and then TDR takings
claims are broken into two parts-a conditional development permit, or
exactions, issue, and a more traditional regulatory takings issue. Part three
discusses the constitutionality of TDR exactions with emphasis on the
Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission7 and
Dolan v. City of Tigard! The impact these decisions have had on TDR
programs is analyzed and several possible strategies for avoiding conflicts
with these decisions are highlighted. Part four discusses the constitutionality of TDR development restrictions in the context of traditional regulatory
takings. The separate approaches to this issue taken by the Supreme Court
in the majority and dissenting opinions to Penn Central are evaluated in
light of the case law since that decision. The two approaches are analyzed
on a policy level and the article argues that the dissent's approach in Penn
Central is the more convincing approach and should be adopted by the
Court in future TDR takings claims. Finally, this article concludes that Penn
Central is outdated in the context of modem TDR programs and should be

6. Many communities are currently considering incorporating TDR programs into local
or regional land management plans. See, e.g., Leslie Brown, Is Lea Hill A Dumping Groundfor
Grmth? Some Residents FearNew County ProposalWould Degrade Their Area, TACOMA MORNNG
NEWS TRm., Mar. 1, 1998, at BI (discussing a proposed TDR program for King County,
Washington); Trine Tsouderos, Bladwrn
ProposesGrowth Rights, TENINIMEAN-NASHVILE, Feb.
1,1998, at I (discussing a proposal for a TDR program in Rutherford County, Tennessee).
7. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
8. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 US. 374 (1994).
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reconsidered by the Court in order to legitimize the role of TDRs in future
land management plans.
I. TDRs AS A LAND USE TOOL
A. The Land Use Dilemma
Land development extracts a heavy toll on the natural environment. It depletes plant and animal habitat, drinking water supplies, and
clean air. It also destroys the aesthetic and recreational values of the natural
environment. However, development also signals economic growth. New
factories, schools, and roads are the signs of a growing and prospering
society. In the United States, we demand this kind of growth. Unfortunately, resource protection frequently requires low density land use, while
economic growth often requires high density use.9 Commonly, the result
is an almost
constant conflict between resource protection and economic
10
growth.
Conflicts between economic growth and resource protection are the
result of market failures. In our free-market society the marketplace has
failed to accurately account for less tangible impacts of development, such
as resource depletion and pollution." Thus, many environmental costs
remain external to developers. The result is that each land user is locked
into a system
that compels him to develop without limit a resource that is
limited.12
Solutions to externality problems are rarely simple. Dividing the
commons into private property internalizes the external costs, but the
difficulties of dividing resources such as underground aquifers that supply
drinking water are readily apparent.' Another solution is government
intervention. The government, acting on behalf of the public welfare, may
force individual landowners to account for their impacts on public

9. See John J.Costonis, Development Rights Transfer An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE LJ. 75
(1973).
10. See, e.g., Dana Clark & David Dowries, What Price Biodiversity?Economic Incentives and
BiodiversityConversion in the United States, 11 J.ENVTL L. & LIG. 9, 73-83 (1996).
11. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulation: Central Planning
Versus Market-BasedApproaches, 19 B.C. ENVL APP. L. REV. 547,549-50 (1992).
12. See, e.g., G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243,1244 (1968).
13. See id. Privatizing the commons can also result in the "tragedy of enclosure."
Privatized land may be viewed by the landowner as an investment with an expected
maximum return. The landowner seeks to maximize the return on his labor. In many cases,
this means overexploiting land in the short run and then reinvesting in a fresh parcel
elsewhere. See George Montbiot, The Tragedy ofEnclosure,SCL AM., JAN. 1994, at 159,159. The
most common example of the tragedy of enclosure is slash and bum agriculture.
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resources." This can be achieved through taxes or restrictions on certain
activities.' In the case of land use, traditional zoning has been the historical
choice for controlling externalities by setting outright limits on land use
and development.
Traditional zoning has been accepted as a valid exercise of the
government's police power,16 and few deny its necessity. However, zoning
is a form of coercion and it infringes upon the freedom of private landowners. When zoning is to prevent a public nuisance to the community,
such as a factory releasing noxious gasses into the surrounding air, exercise
of the government's police power is usually welcomed by a majority of the
public. When zoning is for a less obvious purpose, the exercise of police
power usually meets with greater resistance. Add to this the constitutional
protection of private landowners' rights embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and a major debate arises as to
which activities need to be regulated by the government and which activities should be left to the decentralized private decisions of individuals."
B. Problems with Traditional Zoning
Private landowners have the right to develop their land, but
simultaneously, the public has the right to protect and conserve valuable
natural resources. Our goal then, as a society, is to find the optimal mix of
these rights. Traditional zoning leaves little flexibility for balancing these
competing rights. s Under traditional zoning, when government, through
local land planning agencies and courts, decides the private landowner has
a stronger legal or moral right, the private right prevails at the expense of
the public. When the government decides the public has the stronger legal
or moral right, the public right prevails at the expense of the private
result is an either/or dichotomy with little room for
landowner. The
9
compromise.
Traditional zoning has had little success in finding alternatives to
deal with this either/or dichotomy. Although successful in separating
incompatible land uses, traditional zoning sets rigid, static, and inflexible

14.

See Hardin, supranote 12, at 1244.

15. See id.
16.

See, e.g.,Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

17. See generallyRichard A. Epstein, A ConceptualApproach to Zoning: What's Wrong uith
Euclid, 5 N.Y. ENVL. LJ. 277 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative

Discussion of Environmentaland Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L
REv. 565,567 (1992).
19.

See Costonis, supranote 9, at 7545.
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limits on development.' Land planners try to combat this with special
permits, conditional uses, planned unit developments, and duster zoning,
all of which attempt to provide safety valves to strict zoning regulations.2 1
These mechanisms require landowners to present development plans on
a project-by-project basis for review by local planning bodies that have
discretionary power to approve or disapprove the plans.2 Placing projectby-project discretionary power with local governments often aggravates
coordination problems for landowners, developers, and planners,2
producing inconsistent planning decisions influenced more by politics than
sensible land management.'
Another problem associated with traditional zoning practices is the
lack of compensation provided to landowners whose development rights
are negatively affected. Landowners facing the risk of zoning regulations
that could extinguish development rights are encouraged to accelerate their
rate of development to beat the regulatory dock.' Investors favor rapid
development to lower the risk of future regulations that may erode land
values without compensation.' Compensating landowners and investors
for the negative economic effects of land use regulation removes some of
the risks of land speculation and eliminates the perverse incentives created
by regulatory actions.' These perverse development incentives can be
corrected through legislative enactments, judicial enforcement of the
takings clause, ' or market-based mechanisms such as TDRs.29

20. See Kayden, supranote 18, at 567.
21. See id.
22. Seeid.
23. See Epstein, supranote 17, at 288.
24. See Kayden, supranote 18, at 567.
25. See David A. Dana, Natural Preatimand the Race to Deelop, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 655,
682-84 (1995). Dana suggests two reasons why landowners are encouraged to develop land
in response to fears of land regulation. First, political awareness of natural resource protection
has become so prominent as to increase the potential scope of land regulation to encompass
almost any land. Second, measures to protect natural resources typically contain a lag period
from conception until actual regulation, which typically allows landowners to exploit the
development potential of their land before being subjected to regulation. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 696.
28. See id. at 696706. These methods work by providing compensation to landowners
who have had their land significantly devalued by regulation. Id.
29. See id. at 707. Dana discusses the use of development taxes as a market incentive to
discourage unchecked development. Id. Market incentives, such as TDRs, could also be used
to provide compensation to affected landowners. See infra Part IV(B)(2).
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C. TDRs as an Alternative to Traditional Zoning
TDRs offer a flexible alternative to traditional zoning by allowing
the market more freedom to determine levels and types of development.
TDRs alleviate the either/or dichotomy by allowing the private landowner
to sever his development rights in an area where development is objectionable and transfer them to an area where development is less objectionable s"
Limited natural resources are conserved and the affected landowner is
compensated for his lost right to develop his land."1 TDRs also remove
perverse development incentives by providing compensation to landowners whose land value is severely decreased by zoning regulation. In this
way, TDRs are simultaneously more equitable and more efficient than
traditional zoning practices.3
TDRs are one of many market-based tools being used to protect
valuable natural resources. Market-based mechanisms have captured the
favor of many environmental policymakers due to their cost-effectiveness

30. See Costonis, supra note 9, at 85-86.
31. See id.
32. This assumes minimal transaction costs. How tradable allowance programs such as
TDR schemes can be designed to minimize transaction costs is a subject of much debate. See
generally DANIEL J.DUDEK & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENr, OCDE/GD(96), JoIT IMPLBMTATON, TRANSACTION CoSTs,
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 173 (1996); see also Kayden, supra note 18, at 578-79. In the case of
TDRs, one prominent mechanism for lowering transaction costs is the use of "banks" to act
as intermediaries between buyers and sellers of TDRs. TDR banks buy development rights
from sending zone landowners and then sell them to receiving zone developers. By
facilitating centralized buying and selling, the banks minimize the high transaction costs
associated with locating other participants and gathering information for price-setting The
banking concept has been extremely successful in New Jersey. See NEw JERSEY PINELAND
COMM'N & PINELANDS DEVELOPMENT CREDIT BANK, THE PINELANDS DEVELOPENr CREDrr
PROGRAM (1996) [hereinafter PDC PROGRAM]; see also Terrence D. Moore, New Jersey's Special

Place: The PinelandsNational Reserve, 168 N.J. LAW. 25,28 (1995); Clark & Downes, supra note
10, at 54. A similar banking approach is being considered in Maryland using the State's Rural
Legacy Program as the banking agent. See Harold Jackson, Getting the Basics on Rural Legacy
Plan, BALTIMORE SuN, Apr. 5,1998, at B6. This is a very innovative idea that could be copied
by other state and federal programs with similarconservation goals.
One problem with the banking concept is that programs like the New Jersey
Pinelands typically have only one bank. This creates a monopolistic environment that lacks
the competition necessary to provide incentives for efficient price-setting. This type of market
failure is demonstrated by the Pinelands Development Credit Bank. A recent study by the
bank showed that the bank'svaluation of $2,500 per TDR was well below the $3,950 average
purchase price in the private market See PDC PROGRAM sura,at App. A. Due to this, the bank
had only purchased rights from one landowner between 1994 and 1996. See id.
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and ability to spur creativity and innovation.' Market-based programs are
being used to protect air quality, water quality, endangered and threatened
species' habitat, and wetlands. Market-based programs also have been
proposed for reducing hazardous wastes and controlling carbon dioxide
emissions to the global atmosphere.3' TDRs are being used to protect
drinking water supplies, endangered and threatened species' habitat, and
valuable agricultural land, and many additional uses have been suggested
both nationally and internationally.'
TDRs function like a type of tradable allowance.' In a tradable
allowance scheme the government sets an overall limit on the use of a
resource and then allows users to buy and sell the rights to use the
resource.' The simplest form of a TDR scheme would occur where the
government strips all land of development rights and allocates TDRs to all

33.

See RoER N. STAVNS & BRADLEY W. WHnTHD, ROURCES FOR THE FUtRE,

DISCUSSION PAPER No. 97-10, ThE NEW GERATON OF MARKET-BASED ENV ONMEWrAL
POUCIES 5 (1996); see also Stewart, supra note 11, at 553-54.
34. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 557-59.
35. TDRs may show the most promise in regional land management solutions. One
example is the suggested use of TDRs as part of programs for restoration of the Chesapeake
Bay. See James T.B. Tripp & Michael Oppenheimer, Restoration of the ChapeakeBay: A MultiState InstitutionalChallenge,47 MD.L RE. 425,445 (1988). TDRs have been suggested for use
internationally in several contexts. See Antonio Herman Benjamin & Charles Weiss, Jr.
Economic and Market Incentives as Instruments of Environmental Policy in Brazil and the United
States, 32 TEX. Wr'L LJ.67, 85-89 (1997) (discussing the applicability of American land use
techniques to Brazilian environmental policy); Daniel J.Dudek et al., EnvironmentalPolicyfor
EasternEurope: Technlogy-BasedVersus Market-Based Approaches, 17 COLUM. J.ENVrL L 1, 4344 (1992) (discussing TDRs as a possible environmental management tool for Eastern Europe).
Use of TDRs and other similar tradable land use rights has been suggested for managing the
water and grazing allotments and timber sales on public lands. See Raymond Rasker, A New
Look at Old Vistas: The Economic Role of EnvironmentalQuality in Western Public Lands, 65 U.
CoLO.L.REv. 369, 394-95 (1994). Additionally, TDRs may even be applied to help ease
burdens on landowners caused by other environmental programs. See David Sohn &
Madeline Cohen, Note, From Smokestacks to Species: Extendingthe TradablePermitApproachfrom
Air Pollution to HabitatConseration,15 STAN. ENVrL L.J. 405 (1996) (discussing the extension
of a TDR-like scheme to the Endangered Species Act). See also John Pendergrass, Use of
InstitutionalControlsas Partof a Superfund Remedy: Lessonsfrom Other Programs,26 ENVTL L.
REP. 10,109 (1996) (discussing the use of conservation easements and the purchase of
development rights in the Superfund program); Debbie Sivas, Groundwater Pollutionfrom
Agricultural Activities: Policies for Protection, 7 STAN. ENVr LJ. 117, 178-79 (1988)
(recommending the use of TDRs to manage non-point source water pollution from

agriculture).
36. See Stewart, supranote 11, at556.
37. See id. at 553. See also James T.B. Tripp & Daniel Dudek, Institutional Guidelinesfor
Designing SuccessfulTransferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 371 (1989).
"Government' may refer to federal, state, or local land management agencies depending on
the scope and oversight of the specific TDR program.
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landowners equally.' Landowners wishing to develop beyond their
allocated share of TDRs would have to purchase rights from surrounding
landowners." In this way, the market is allowed to control the allocation
of development
Most active TDR programs are much more complex. Typically, the
TDR program is designed to protect valuable environmental resources and
does so by designating "sending" and "receiving" zones based on desired
levels of development and natural resource value.4 Generally, development in sending zones is heavily restricted and TDR allocation is higher.4'
Development in receiving zones is less restricted and TDR allocation is
lower.4' Landowners in receiving zones are allowed to develop their land,
but they must purchase TDRs to do so.' Thus, "sending" zones tend to
transfer development rights to "receiving" zones." In this manner,
development is directed away from ecologically or environmentally
sensitive lands to areas better equipped to deal with heavy development.*
Landowners in sending zones benefit from compensation for the environmental value of their land, and landowners in receiving zones gain the
development value of the TDRs." At the same time, the community

38. See David Berry & Gene Steiker, An Ecmuic Analysis of Transfer of Demlopment Rights,
17 NAT. RES. J.55,61 n.21 (1977).
39. See Tripp & Dudek, supra note 37, at 371.
40. See id. at 373. See also Berry & Steiker, supra note 38, at 60. "Sending" zones are also

referred to as "no-growth" or "protection" zones and "receiving" zones are also referred to
as "growth" zones.
41. See generally THE MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPrTAL PARK AND PLANNING CON'N,
FUNCTIONAL MASrER PLAN FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL OPEN SPACE

INMONTGOMERY COUNTY 41 (1980) [hereinafter MONTGOMERY COUNTY PLAN).
42. See id.
43. Seid.
44. Another option is for conservation organizations or government agencies to purchase
the development rights. Organizations such as the Nature Conservancy regularly purchase
conservation easements over ecologically valuable land. See David Farrier, Conserving
Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management or Compensation for Lost Expectations, 19
HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 303,350-52 (1995). Government agencies such as the U.S. Department

of Agriculture already have well-established programs for acquiring conservation easements
over farmland and wetlands. See, e.g., Clark & Downes, supra note 10, at 43-45; KEITH WIEBE
ET AL, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., ECON. RESOURCES SERV., AGRIc. ECON. REPORT No. 744, PARTIAL

INTERESTS IN LAND- POLICY TOOLS FOR RESOURCE USE AND CONSERVATION 11-14 (1996).
Although development right acquisitions by conservation organizations and land
management agencies may be highly beneficial from an environmental perspective, it may
undermine programs by creating unanticipated competition for TDRs, driving prices up and
hindering economic development in the region. Larger programs trading in higher volumes
of TDRs will be less affected because the unanticipated competition will be diluted by the
larger pool of TDRs being traded.

45. See Tripp & Dudek, supra note 37, at 373.
46. See id.
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benefits from the introduction of a market-based mechanism for allocating
development rights that achieves resource protection more efficiently.'
Actual TDR programs exist in many states and for various
reasons.4 Twenty-two states give statutory approval for the use of TDRs.0
The earliest plans were designed to protect historical landmarks in cities
such as New York.' Later plans focus more on protection of ecologically
sensitive lands. The New Jersey Pinelands TDR program (New Jersey Plan)
is one of the oldest and most successful environmentally based plans.' The
New Jersey Plan was established in the early 1980s to prevent the
urbanization of a large area of ecologically sensitive land in southern New
Jersey.'m Around the same time, another highly visible TDR program
emerged in Montgomery County, Maryland (Maryland Plan), to protect the
dwindling supply of farmland within proximity to our nation's capital '
Examples of other uses of TDR programs include protection of wetlands5'
and beaches5 ' in Florida, preservation of ranchland in Main County,
California,5 ' and protection of sensitive ecological resources surrounding
Lake Tahoe in California and Nevada" and on Long Island in New York

47. See id.
48. See infra Appendix A. This is not an exhaustive list. Many small TDR programs
already exist or are being considered at the local level. See Brown & Tsouderos, supra note 6.

49. See infra Appendix B.
50. See FRANKLIN J. JAMES &DENNIS E GALE, ZONING FOR SALE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
TRANSERABLE DEVELoPmENr RrazG PROGRAMS 9-11 (1977). See alsoPenn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,108-15 (1978).
51. See Moore,supra note 32. SeegenerallyEllen M Randle, The NationalReserve System and
TrasferableDevelopment Rights: Isthe New Jersey PinelandsPlan an Unconstitutional"Taking"?,
10 B.C. ENVTL AiF. L. REV. 183 (1982). The Pinelands is one of the few TDR programs on
which significant economic research has been and continues to be performed. See, e.g., W.
Patick Beaton, The Impact ofRegional Land-Use Controls on Property Values: The Case of the New
Jersey Pineands,67 LAND ECON. 172 (1991); NEw JERSEY PINELANDS COMM'N, ECONOMIC &
FIAL eACI OF THE PINELANm COMPREHENsrVE MANAGEMENT PLAN (1983). Additionally,
plans are in place to carry out longer term ecological and economic studies in the region. See,
e.g., NEW JERSEY PNELANDS COMM'N, LONG-TERM PINELANM ECONOMIC MONUORING
PROGRAM (1996); NEW JERSEY PINELANDs COM N, LONG-TERM PINELANs ENvIRONMENTAL
MONIORING PROGRAM (1995).

52. See Moore supra note 32, at 26-28.
53. MONTGOMERY COUNTY PLAN, supranote 41, at 1-2.

54. Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So.2d 1030,1032-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review
denied, 570 So.2d 1304 (Fla. 1990).
55. City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So.2d 1332,1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989),
review denied, 441 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1990).
56.

Barancik v. County of Main, 872 F.2d 834,835 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S.

894(1989).
57. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,729-30 (1997).
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State.58 Overall, TDR programs have been used throughout the United
States at both regional and local levels with varying degrees of success.
The concept of a TDR is relatively simple, but designing and
implementing an effective TDR program can be difficult and complex. The
community seeking to implement a TDR program must have the right
political, legal, and economic climate present before a successful program
can take shape. Foremost among these concerns are the constitutional
issues raised by TDRs. The following discussion demonstrates the
precarious constitutionality of TDRs.
II. TDRs IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Generally, legal challenges to TDR programs may be brought
based on claims of unconstitutional takings, procedural non-compliance,
and improper tax assessment."' Of these types of challenges, unconstitutional takings claims are the most serious. The other types of challenges are
generally less severe and the basis for claims falling within these categories
is dependent on state law where the claims arise.
A.

Background of Takings Claims

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution insure
protection of private landowners' rights by prohibiting the taking of
private property "for public use, without just compensation. " ' ° Many state
constitutions also contain similar private property protection clauses.61 The
eminent domain power allows the government to take private land for the
public benefit when it advances a legitimate state interest' Generally, if the
government permanently seizes or physically occupies land, it constitutes
an exercise of eminent domain power and the government must pay just
compensation. 3 When the alleged taking does not result in a physical

58. Michael R. Jung, The Pine Barrens:A New Model of Land Use Controlfor New York, 3
BUFF. ENvTL L.J. 37,38-40 (1995).

59. Equal protection claims may also be raised, but generally have not been successful.
Procedural non-compliance would include claims brought under the National Environmental
Policy Act or various other equivalent state acts. Improper tax assessment claims arise out of
the difficulties in deciding how TDRs attach value to property, and whether TDRs constitute
property that can be valued independently for tax assessment purposes.

60. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is applicable to states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 US. 374,383-84 (1994) (citing Chicago,
B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,239 (1897)).
61. Dana, supra note 25, at 659.
62.

See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,239.41 (1984).

63. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US. 419 (1982). See also
Dana, supra note 25, at 659.
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occupation of property, but rather restricts its use through government

regulation, the issue of whether there has been an unconstitutional taking
becomes extremely complex. Under current Supreme Court precedent,
courts inquire into the legitimacy of the state interest advanced by the
regulation and the resulting burden placed on the private landowner."
The main policy goal of compensating landowners for regulatory
takings is to prevent individuals from bearing a disproportionately heavy
burden of the cost of advancing the public welfare. As noted by the
Supreme Court, "[tIhe determination that governmental action constitutes
a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than
a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the
public interest."6" The end goal is to prevent the government from
establishing land use regulation that amounts to "an out-and-out plan of
extortion."" As Justice Holmes wrote in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, a

"strong public desire to improve the public condition [will not) warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying
for the change.""
B. The Legal Identity of TDR9

In order to understand how the takings inquiry proceeds when a
TDR program is the challenged regulation, one must first understand the
legal nature of TDRs. Real property exists as a bundle of rights that
includes the right to possess, use, and dispose of the property.' The right
to develop is a use that exists as one strand in this bundle. TDR programs,
in rhetoric, treat this strand as a'separate and unique right that may be
severed from the parcel of land and assigned to other parcels of land, upon
receipt of some type of payment. However, in a legal sense, this is an
inaccurate description of what occurs when development rights are
"transferred."
Facially, TDRs assume the right to develop is a general government
benefit that is conferred upon the land." However, it is highly doubtful that
the government has such far-reaching powers. The government does not
have dominion over property rights nor any absolute power to generate

64. See Dana,supranote 25, at 659.
65. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980).
66. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,837 (1987).
67. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US. 393,416 (1922).
68. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 US. 373,377 (1945).
69. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843 n.2 ('ITihe right to build on one's own property-even though
its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements--cannot remotely be
described as a 'governmental benefit."').
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such rights."° The government does not have any possessory interest in
development rights, and it can only obtain development rights by
exercising the power of eminent domain. In such situations the property
owner is entitled to just compensation under the Constitution, unless the
government possesses the right to prohibit the activity under state common
law of nuisance or property.' Until the government obtains the property,
the development rights exist attached to the property and in the possession
of the legal titleholder' The concept of zoning necessarily implies this
conclusion. Zoning does not allocate or attach development rights to land,
but rather restricts rights already attached to the land. Thus, the right to
develop exists as a natural right in property. Any other conclusion implies
that private property exists as a benefit bestowed upon us by an allpossessing government.
TDR programs use zoning restrictions to create a contrived market
for development rights. Restrictions on development in sending zones are
severe and result in extinguishment of future development rights entirely
or almost entirely. On this side of the coin, TDRs have characteristics
normally associated with exercise of the eminent domain power. Zoning
restrictions in the receiving zone are slightly different Future development
in the receiving zone is conditioned on the purchase of "development
rights" from landowners in the sending zone. On this side of the coin,
TDRs strongly resemble conditional permits or exactions. Thus, development in the receiving zone is restricted, but a pre-approved variance to this
restriction is created whereby the landowner can pay parties in the sending
zone and in return be granted automatic relief from the zoning restrictions
of the receiving zone. In simplest terms, the receiving zone landowner's
right to develop is conditioned upon cash payment to a sending zone
landowner. The practical effect of a TDR program is that the landowner in
the sending zone loses his development right and compensation for this

70. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US. 1003,1028 (1992) (stating "that
title is somehow held subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may subsequently
eliminate all
economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded
in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture."). See also RKHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 12-13 (1985)
(describing Locke's theory of property as contained in the American Constitution). Epstein
elaborates that "[the state can acquire nothing by simple declaration of its will but must
justify its claims in terms of the rights of the individuals whom it protects: 'a State, by /se
dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation.'" Id.
at 12 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 US. 155,164 (1980)).
71.
72.

See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27.
See Randle, supra note 51, at 201-02,209.
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loss is provided through an exaction placed on the landowner in the
receiving zone.73
Given the artificial nature of this market, the appropriate inquiry
into the constitutionality of a TDR program is twofold.' First, does the
exaction placed on landowners in the receiving zone amount to an
unconstitutional taking? Second, does the extinguishment of a landowner's
future development rights in the sending zone amount to an unconstitutional taking? And, if so, is just compensation provided?
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TDR EXACTIONS
Exactions have become common land management tools for local
communities.' The power to impose exactions is derived from a state's
police power. Thus, exactions allow communities to exercise considerable
control over land management without having to invoke the power of
eminent domain and provide just compensation to affected landowners.'
TDR programs require that exactions be placed on landowners in receiving
zones. The landowner in the receiving zone is granted a permit to develop
above existing levels conditioned upon the purchase of a development
right from a landowner in a sending zone. In this way the exaction serves
to create demand for TDRs, allowing the marketplace to function.
Until the mid-1980s, local governments were given rather broad
police powers in the context of land management and zoning and,
therefore, exactions increasingly gained popularity."' Thus far, few
challenges have been raised concerning the constitutionality of TDR
exactions." Penn Central'sholding never addressed the issue because the

73. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 748 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that TDRs essentially shift the burden of compensation to third parties);
see also Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying"forthe Change: Using Eminent Domain
to Secure Exactionsand Sidestep Nollan and Dolan,81 VA. L Ruv. 1801,1871 (1995) (arguing that
TDRs can be designed to achieve the same goals as traditional exactions).
74. See Note, The Unconstitutionalityof Transferable Development Rights, 84 Yale L.J. 1101
(1975) for a similar twofold analysis. The Note was written prior to several important
decisions in takings jurisprudence that have significantly shaped how TDRs may be viewed
in modem takings law.
75. See Kendall & Ryan, supranote 73, at 1802.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., Agins v. Tibumron, 447 U.S. 255,260-62 (1980) (holding scenic zoning within
the police power); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 US. 104,138 (1978) (holding
landmark preservation within the police power); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (holding residential zoning within the police power).
78. In the only case located in which a developer brought a takings claim on the
exactions side of a TDR program, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the claim from other
exactions takings claims on the basis that the fee was being paid to other landowners and not
the government. See Barancik v. County of Main, 872 .2d 834,837 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
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TDR scheme in that case only involved internal trading. More modem TDR
programs use external trading, which significantly expands the use of TDR
exactions." At the same time, Supreme Court opinions have significantly
narrowed the power to condition development permits, which possibly
exposes modem TDR exactions to constitutional challenges.
A. The "Essential Nexus" Test
In Nollan v. Califbrnia Coastal Commission'e the Supreme Court
established a requirement that there be an "essential nexus" between the
purpose of the imposed exaction and the purpose that would be served by
simply proscribing the proposed development.81 The Nollans, landowners
owning a beachfront lot in Ventura, California, wanted to tear down an
existing bungalow and replace it.' In order to do so, they were required to
obtain a permit from the California Coastal Commission.' The Commission granted the permit on the condition that the Nollans record a deed
restriction dedicating a public walkway for beach access across a portion
of their property."4 The Commission alleged the public walkway was
necessary because the Nollan's development plans would restrict the
public's view of the beach and, in conjunction with cumulative development in the surrounding area, would burden the public's ability to access
the shorefront.' In rejecting this reasoning, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, observed that if the Commission had simply required the Nollans
to dedicate an easement for the public walkway, a taking would have
certainly existed.' Scalia accepted the Commission's argument that
protecting the public's ability to see the beach is a legitimate exercise of the
police power." He accepted the proposition that the Commission could
"deny the Nollans their permit outright if their new house (alone, or by
reason of the cumulative impact produced in conjunction with other
construction) would substantially impede these purposes, unless the denial
would impede so drastically with the Nollans' use of their property as to

U.S. 894 (1989).

79. Internal trading occurs where a firm is allocated development rights that it may only
exercise on other properties it owns. External trading occurs where a firm may sell its share
of development rights to third party landowners.
80. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 US. 825 (1987).
81. Id. at 837; Kendall & Ryan, supranote 73, at 1803.
82.
83.

See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-28.
See id. at 828.

84. See id.
85.
86.

See id. at 828-29.
See id. at 831.

87. See id. at 836.
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constitute a taking." Scalia then reasoned that inherent within this power
is the power to create a permit condition that serves the sane legitimate
purpose as an outright denial of the permit.W However, he stated this
power must be limited to where an "essential nexus" exists between the
permit condition and the original purpose of the development restriction.'
Scalia then held that the permit condition imposed on the Nollans is
outside of this "essential nexus" and, thus, is not a valid exercise of the
police power."1 Finding the Commission's exaction invalid, Scalia
concluded that "if the [Commission] wants an easement across the Nolans'
property, it must pay for it."' 2 In reaching his conclusion, Scalia raised the
bar that municipalities must pass for proving the validity of exactions,
stating the following:
We view the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause to be more
than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be
more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination. As
indicated earlier, our cases describe the condition for abridgement of property rights through the police power as a
'substantialadvanc[ing]' of a legitimate state interest. We are
inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where
the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context there is
heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power
objective. "
Overall, the opinion removed some of the deference previously given to
most land use ordinances and severely limited the power of municipalities
to use exactions to advance land management plans.
Noilan could have serious implications on TDR programs. Proving
that purchase of a development right attached to land in a sending zone
serves the same police-power purpose as denying the right to increase
development on land in a receiving zone can be very tenuous. Under
Nollan, the local planning body bears the burden of showing this, a burden
that probably becomes increasingly difficult as the sending parcel becomes
more and more remote from the receiving parcel. The way in which the
planning body defines the purpose of the TDR program is crucial to this
analysis. If denial of the right to increase development in the receiving zone
would serve the purpose of alleviating traffic or preserving aesthetic value,
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id. at 835-36.
See id. at 836.
See id.
at 837.
See id. at83842.
See id. at 842.
Id. at 841 (alteration in original).
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then the purpose of the exaction must serve the same goal. Certainly, it is
hard to imagine how a TDR purchase requirement placed on a receiving
zone that is already developed to a certain degree will share an "essential
nexus" with an easement guaranteeing preservation of open space in a
sending zone." Consequently, TDR programs may become very vulnerable
to a constitutional attack on the same grounds as the attack in Nollan. In his
Nollan dissent, Justice Blackmun warns of the impact the majority's opinion
could have on innovative land management techniques such as TDRs by
stating "[tihe land-use problems this country faces require creative
solutions [and] [tihese are not advanced by an 'eye for an eye' mentality.'
B. The "Rough Proportionality" Test
In another case dealing with the constitutional limits of exactions,
the Supreme Court added to the "essential nexus" test a requirement that
"rough proportionality" exist between the imposed permit condition and
the anticipated impact of the proposed development. In Dolan v. City of
Tigard, Dolan sought a building permit to expand the size of her plumbing
and electrical supply store located in Tigard, OregonY9 On appeal from the
Supreme Court of Oregon, the Court considered whether the city of Tigard
could condition the approval of Dolan's building permit on the dedication

94. See, e.g., John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic,74 MINN. L. REV. 339,352 n.39

(1989). It is dearly difficult to pass the essential nexus test for two of the most common types
of TDR programs, protection of open space and preservation of agricultural land. Denying

a permit to increase housing units on a tract of land already containing houses does not serve
the same purpose as protecting open space since the tract is already developed. Likewise,
denying a permit to build in a vacant lot does not serve the same purpose as preserving

agricultural land. Similar problems may arise when trying to draw the nexus for protecting
wildlife habitat or drinking water supplies.
95. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 865. In a separate dissent to Nollan, Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, states his apprehension to the majority's holding more strongly
State agencies...require considerable flexibility in responding to private

desires for development in a way that guarantees the preservation of public
access to the coast. They should be encouraged to regulate development in

the context of the overall balance of competing uses of the shoreline. The
Court today does precisely the opposite, overruling an eminently reasonable
exercise of an expert state agency's judgment, substituting its own narrow

view of how this balance should be struck. Its reasoning is hardly suited to
the complex reality of natural resource protection in the 20th century. I can
only hope that today's decision is an aberration, and that a broader vision

ultimately prevails.
Id. at 864.
96. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,379 (1994).
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as a public greenway for flood control and
of a portion of her property
7
traffic improvements.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found the exaction did
advance a legitimate state interest and did pass the "essential nexus" test
of Nollan.9 Citing thirteen different state decisions, Rehnquist extended the
requirements of the essential nexus test by introducing a "rough proportionality" test that "encapsulates what the Court holds to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment." Rehnquist's "rough proportionality" test
requires the Court "to determine whether the degree of the exactions
demanded by the.. .permit conditions bear[] the required relationship to the
projected impact of.. .proposed development. " "® In performing this test,
Rehnquist states that "[njo precise mathematical formula is required, but
the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development." 1 In rejecting the city's claims that the exaction
was roughly proportional because it could offset some of the increased
traffic demand created by the new store, Rehnquist required that the city
"make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for
the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it
could offset some of the traffic demand generated." 10
In reaching the conclusion in Dolan, Rehnquist made no attempts
to hide the fact that the Court was once again raising the bar for exactions.
Rehnquist made it dear that the "rough proportionality" test was not to be
equated with the "rational basis" test's minimal level of scrutiny employed
under the Equal Protection Clause.s Although Rehnquist states twice that
no mathematical formula is required to pass the "rough proportionality"
test,"' the decision makes it hard to imagine how the test could be passed
without resorting to such formulas.' Additionally, Rehnquist places the

97. See id. at 377.
98. See id. at 387.
99. See id. at 391.
100. See id. at 388.
101. See id. at 391.
102. See id. at 395-96.
103. See id. at 391.
104. See id. at 391, 395.
105. In determining that the greenway could offset some of the new traffic created by the
expansion of Dolan's store, the city had already calculated the number of additional trips that
the expansion would generate. See id. at 395. Rehnquist would require the city to show that
the greenway "will, or is likely to, offset some of the traffic demand." If all that Rehnquist
requires is replacing the city's use of could before offset with will or likely, his argument seems
pointless or, else, merely a play on words. See id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is far more

likely that Rehnquist would require some sort of mathematical calculation, preciseness being
debatable, to pass the "rough proportionality" test.
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burden of proof for showing "rough proportionality" on the government
when the exaction resembles an adjudicative decision."° ' Thus, Dolan has
the effect of extending the limitations of Nollan by making it more difficult
for local land management agencies to attach exactions to plans for
development.
Passing the "rough proportionality" test could prove a very
difficult task for planners wishing to use TDRs. By nature, the price of a
TDR is not based on the impact of development on the parcel of land
saddled with the exaction. The price is wholly independent of this impact.
TDR prices will always be a function of supply and demand that is
influenced most by the profitability of exercising development rights to
increase the commercial value of a piece of property.'W Based on this alone,
TDRs probably cannot be made to pass Rehnquist's "rough proportionality" test. Of course, one may argue that the value of development rights is
equivalent to the conservation value'e of land in the sending zone and,
therefore, an exaction based on this value is roughly proportional to the
impact caused by development in the receiving zone, assuming constant
conservation values across zones.' Ignoring the "essential nexus"
problems of this argument, one can see how this argument may work for
TDR programs designed to protect open space or agricultural lands. But,
for plans to protect drinking water supplies, the argument becomes much
more difficult to make. Under this latter scenario, how can a planning body
possibly "quantify its findings in support" of the exaction? The local
planning body is left with the decidedly impossible task of showing some
type of proportional relationship between the impacts of an individual
landowner's development plans on an underground aquifer and the price
of a development right located in a remote parcel of land. In essence, the

106. See id. at 391. Rehnquist acknowledges that in evaluating legislatively enacted zoning
regulations affecting a class of landowners, the burden rests on the party challenging the
regulations. Id. at 391 n.8. It is debatable which standard would be applied to a TDR
challenge. TDR programs are typically implemented through legislative acts. However, the
amount of the exaction is determined by the private market. Thus, the price paid for a TDR
is determined on an individualized basis without any reliance on a general class formula,
thus, closely resembling an adjudication.
107. See Berry & Steiker, supra note 38, at 62-65 (discussing valuation of development

rights).
108. Defining conservation value in this case to mean the difference in the value of the
land at full development and the value of land undeveloped. This does not reflect any value
the land might have due to environmental benefits it bestows upon the community. Rather,
it reflects the opportunity costs incurred by leaving the land to remain undeveloped.
109. This assumption is probably unrealistic. TDR prices will always be a function of
supply and demand that is influenced most by the profitability of exercising development
rights to increase the commercial value of land in a receiving zone.
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implications of Rehnquist's "rough proportionality" test are crippling to
many TDR programs.
Taken together, Nollan and Dolan pose serious problems for land
use planners wishing to use TDRs. The problems originate in the nature of
the exaction that must be made on landowners wishing to develop in a
receiving zone. Under Nollan's "essential nexus" test, an exaction must first
be related in nature to the type of harm caused by the proposed development. After this test is passed, the exaction must still pass Dolan's "rough
proportionality" test. Land planners must prove that they have not sought
too much with the exaction. Taken individually and together, these tests
may be difficult for even well-designed TDR programs to pass.
C. Analysis: How TDR Programs May Survive the Exactions Challenge
Synergistically, Nollan and Dolan seem to strictly limit the extent to
which commercial development values may influence the TDR prices
landowners in receiving zones are forced to pay.'10 Since the market for
TDRs is based fundamentally on commercial development value, the
holdings in Nollan and Dolan may be used to disable the private market
concept and render TDR programs (even those designed to comply with
Nollan and Dolan) ineffective. Why, then, aren't TDR programs typically
2
challenged on the exactions issue? As stated in Nollan.. and Dolan," local
planning agencies have considerable leeway in exercising the police power
to control land use planning. Included in this power is the power to restrict
development, so long as it "'substantially advance[s] legitimate state
interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
land.""' Thus, there is no constitutional requirement that local governments grant relief from receiving zone density restrictions. If a landowner
would challenge the exaction issue and prevail, he would not benefit by
gaining relief from development restrictions, because local government
retains the power to restrict development absent the exaction. The only
gain from a challenge on the exactions side of the issue would be to prove
the TDR component of local land planning facially invalid.
Exactions challenges are still important to TDR programs. The
extent to which localities may unilaterally apply TDR programs is heavily
dependent on the degree of freedom they are granted to exercise the police

110. See Kendall & Ryan, supra note 73, at 1814 ("The [Supreme] Court's tests for assessing
whether a particular exaction is fair do not allow consideration of the benefit that the
landowner will receive from the development").
III. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987).
112. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 US. 374,384-8 (1994).
113. See id. at 385 (alterations in original) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260 (1980)).
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power. The decisions in Nollan and Dolan heavily influence this freedom."'
Additionally, TDR programs may be vulnerable to attack, especially when
developed in a political climate where the program is seen as a last-ditch
compromise between economic growth and resource protection. If either
side of the controversy feels that presenting the community with an
either/or choice of development or resource protection will work to their
benefit, an exactions challenge could serve the purpose of forcing the
choice and eliminating the opportunity for compromise. Therefore, it is
very crucial that TDR programs be designed to survive exactions challenges. Arguments to overcome exactions challenges may either challenge
the validity of applying the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality"
tests to TDR exactions or attempt to adopt TDR exactions to meet the
requirements of these tests.
1. "Essential Nexus" and "Rough Proportionality"Tests Are Not Applicable to
TDR Exactions
Since the Supreme Court's rulings in Nollan and Dolan, lower
courts have struggled with how broadly to apply the Court's decisions.
One way that courts have avoided applying the heightened scrutiny
required by the two decisions has been to narrowly limit their application.
Strategies to avoid application of the "essential nexus" and "rough
proportionality" tests to TDR programs proceed by arguing the decisions
(1) only apply to exactions that amount to physical appropriations of
property; (2) only apply to individualized determinations and not
legislatively enacted programs; and/or (3) only apply to unilateral
government programs and not voluntary participation programs. The
following sections discuss how each of these arguments would proceed.
a. Only Applicable to Exactions That Amount to Physical Appropriationsof
Property
Nollan and Dolan both required the affected landowners to grant
public easements to portions of their properties. In both cases the Court
found this amounted to a physical appropriation of property." The
physical appropriation of property is one of the most serious forms of
governmental intrusion and such invasions are deemed per se takings that

114.

See, e.g., Kendall & Ryan, supranote 73, at 1803. In light of Noilan and Dolan, Penn

Central would have had a possible claim against the city on the exactions side of the issue if
the city followed through and conditioned future development of Penn Central's adjacent lots

on the exercise of the development rights allocated to Grand Central Terminal. See infra Part

IV(A).
115.

Nollan, 483 US.T at 831-32; Dolan, 512 Us. at 393.

480
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require compensation."" Takings jurisprudence draws a distinction
between physical takings and regulatory takings.
In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme Court reiterated this
point by stating "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government, than when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good."1 The basis for this distinction is that a physical appropriation impedes every strand in the bundle of rights, 9 while a development
exaction typically only limits a single strand-the right to use or develop.'
Thus, a development exaction not requiring dedication of actual land
presents less severe constitutional concerns.'
'
Several courts have used this difference to distinguish Nollan and
Dolan in the context of development exactions."2 As applied to TDR

116. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,426 (1982)
("[Wle have long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a property restriction
of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings Clause.")
117. See, e.g., Zerbetz v. Municipality of Anchorage, 856 P.2d 777,782-84 (Alaska 1993)
(bifurcating a takings claim that contained a regulatory element and a physical invasion
element).
118. Loretto, 458 US. at 426 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 US. 104,

124 (1978)).
119. See id. at 435.
120. See, e.g., New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084,1088 (1lthCir. 1996),
cert. denied, 521 US. 1121 (1997).
121. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (using the deed restriction requirement to distinguish the
exaction in that case from permissible uses of police power in land use regulation). A
monetary development exaction is not considered a physical taking. See, e.g., Commercial
Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 US. 931
(1992) (citing United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989)).
122. See, e.g., New Port Largo, 95 F.3d at 1088 (not applicable where regulation restricts
landowners profitable use of property rather than opening the property for public use); Sintra,
Inc. v. City of Seattle, 935 P.2d 555,571 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (limited to physical invasions
of private property and not applicable to the "doctrine of regulatory takings, which is
concerned with the overly burdensome restrictions on the use of private property"); McCarthy
v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836,845 (Kan. 1995) (not applicable to impact fees because there
is no physical taking involved); Waters Landing Limited Partnership v. Montgomery County,
650 A.2d 712,724 (Md. 1994) (not applicable to development impact tax that does not involve
a physical taking). Some courts have applied heightened scrutiny to all takings claims. See,
e.g., Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 583 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on other
grounds, 973 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 US. 1081 (1993) ("We interpret Nolan as
holding that in cases brought under the takings clause we must undertake a close analysis of
the means of protecting the asserted governmental interest."). One court has applied
heightened scrutiny based on the inclusion of a provision with similar intent in a state statute.
See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (CaL1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 929 (1996). Other
courts have applied a relaxed reading of Nollan to takings claims not involving a physical
invasion. See, e.g., Commercial Builders of Northern Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872,
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exactions, the distinction may be valid. The TDR exaction only infringes on
the right to develop and, even then, does not usually extinguish the right
entirely. The landowner's right to possess, convey, and exclude remain
intact. Because the landowner's property rights are infringed only
minimally, the need to apply the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan
is lessened because the chances that individual landowners will be forced
to bear a disproportionately large cost of advancing the public welfare are
reduced. Thus, TDR exactions are not so severe as to require application of
the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" tests.
b. Only Applicable to Individualized Determinations and Not Legislatively
Enacted Programs
Nollan and Dolanboth dealt with individualized determinations of
appropriate exactions. In both instances the Court found the individualized
nature of the levied exactions raised serious concerns.' In Ehrlich v. Culver
City, the California Supreme Court elaborated on these concerns by stating
that "[iut is the imposition of land use conditions in individual cases,
authorized by a permit scheme which by its nature allows for both the
discretionary deployment of the police power and an enhanced potential
for its abuse, that constitutes the sine qua non for application of the
intermediate standard of scrutiny formulated by the court in Nollan and
Dolan." ' In Home Builders Assoc. v. City of Scottsdale, the Arizona Supreme
Court did not apply heightened scrutiny to a development exaction enacted
as part of Arizona's Groundwater Management Act, which imposed a fee
of $1,000 per single family residence, $600 per apartment unit, and $2,000
per acre-foot of estimated water consumption for other uses on new

874-75 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992) ("[njexus between the fee provision here
at issue, designed to further the city's legitimate interest in housing, and the burdens caused
by commercial development is sufficient to pass constitutional muster"); Outdoor Systems,
Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 616 (9th Cir. 1993) (vacant-lot provisions requiring the
removal of nonconforming billboards whenever land supporting them is developed is within
cities' interests in restricting billboards and eliminating nonconforming billboards); Naegele
Outdoor Advertising, Inc.v. City of Durham, 844 F2d 172,178 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[Pjrohibition
of certain billboard advertising is directly related to the city's interest in aesthetics."); Gameau
v. City of Seattle, 897 F. Supp. 1318,1325-26 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (ordinance requiring landlords
to pay one-half cost of relocating displaced low-income tenants was within the nexus of and
roughly proportional to the state interest in protecting low-income tenants being displaced
by private development); McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 Y.Supp. 604,606-07 (M.D. Fla.
1989) (restrictions on development reasonably related to town's goal of preserving sand dunes
where development would harm vegetation and cause erosion of dunes on adjacent property).
123. See Nollan,483 U.S. at 835-36 n.4; Dolan, 512 US. at 391-92 n.8.
124. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429,439 (Cal.1996), cert. denied, 519 US. 929 (1996)
(applying a heightened scrutiny standard based on its inclusion in California's Mitigation Fee
Act).
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developments.ls The court reasoned that the risk of "regulatory leveraging" feared in Dolan is not present "when the exaction is embodied in a
generally applicable legislative decision."" Other courts have applied
similar reasoning to distinguish Nollan and Dolan." Thus, where a
development exaction is legislatively enacted, there is a strong argument
against the need to apply Nollan and Dolan and unnecessarily burden the
ability of land use planners to function.
TDRs present a special situation in this context. Most TDR
programs are legislatively enacted," but the determination of the price of
TDR exactions is made on an individual basis using the marketplace to set
the price. In this way, TDR exactions are not purely legislative or
adjudicative.' However, the concerns expressed in Nollan and Dolan are
not present in TDR exactions. In a well-designed TDR program, individual
determinations are not subject to government interference. A properly
operating marketplace should be incapable of discrimination or "regulatory
leveraging" and should prevent unduly burdensome individual determina-

125. In Home Builders Assoc. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993,1000 (Ariz.1997), cert.
denied, 521 US. 1120 (1997) (en banc).
126. See id.
127. See, e.g., Texas Manufactured Housing Assoc., Inc. v. City of Nederland, 101 P.3d
1095, 1105 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 US. 1112 (1997) (distinguishing general zoning
ordinance applying to entire areas of city from individualized exactions levied in Nollan and
Dolan); Parking Assoc. of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 203 n.3 (Ga. 1994), cert.
denied, 515 US. 1116 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 US. 1178 (1995) (Dolan not applicable where
exaction is legislatively determined and applicable to many landowners); Waters Landing
Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712,724 (Md. 1994) (Dolannot applicable
to development impact tax imposed by legislative enactment); Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of
Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281,286 (Minn. Ct.App. 1996) (Dolan does not apply to a city wide,
legislative land use regulation).
128. See, e.g., Philip J.Tierney, Bold PromisesBut Baby Steps: Maryland's Growth Policy to the
Year 2020, 23 U. BALT. L RiV. 461, 496 (1994); Joseph D. Stinson, TransferringDevelopment
Rights- Purpose,Problems,and Prospects in New York,17 PACE L REV. 319,337-38 (1996); Jennifer
L. Bradshaw, The Slippery Slope of Modern Takings Jurisprudence in New Jersey, 7 SUMON HALL
CONSr. LU. 433,455-57 (1997).
129. Viewed this way, TDRs are partially legislative because thd program is applied
unilaterally to all landowners within a zoning classification. However, they are also partially
adjudicative because the cost of purchasing a TDR is not unilaterally fixed and will most
likely be unique for each landowner at the time of each transaction. Small volume trading will
be subject to stronger influences from individual whims, resulting in a higher degree of
arbitrariness in price-setting. As the volume of TDR trading increases, a program will tend to
more closely resemble a legislative enactment because the price setting structure will be less
influenced by individual decisions and will become more objectively applied across the
board. Although a TDR exaction will never be an actual legislatively applied fixed-fee, high
volumes of trading will tend to promote the same traits and will minimize fears of
arbitrariness or unreasonableness (a fully informed market will never set an arbitrary or
unreasonable price).
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tions. Concerns may arise over the possibility of market failure."" Yet these
concerns can be overcome in a well-designed TDR program by setting a
legislatively determined upper bound on TDR prices, so that even in the
event of a market failure, TDR exactions will not become burdensome
enough to raise constitutional concerns. Thus, a legislatively enacted TDR
program should not be subject to heightened scrutiny, because the use of
the marketplace in determining TDR prices eliminates fears of improper
regulatory leveraging.
c. Only Applicable to Unilateral Government Programs and Not Voluntary
ParticipationPrograms
Some TDR programs are designed as voluntary programs that
supplement other, more traditional land use applications. For example, in
Montgomery County Maryland, a voluntary TDR program has been used
to successfully preserve valuable agricultural land for over a decade.'
Such voluntary applications of TDR programs easily overcome TDR
exaction challenges. In a voluntary program, the receiving zone landowner
would be given the option of obtaining a variance to current development
restrictions through traditional variance proceedings or by purchasing
development rights. The purchase of development rights may be encouraged by local planners through pre-approval of the variance or other
incentive mechanisms. Since the receiving zone landowner is given a choice
of avenues through which to proceed, courts will probably find the
possibility of improper use of the police power greatly diminished.m Thus,
courts may be less likely to apply heightened scrutiny to a program's TDR
exactions and the program may more easily survive an exactions challenge.

130. See, e.g., Kayden, supra note 18, at 577-78.
131. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY PLAN, supra note 41, at 43. Even though the plan is
voluntary it has experienced heavy trading, which has resulted in preservation of substantial
amounts of farmland. See generally MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING
COMN, STAUS REPOr ON THE MONTC4*R

COUNTY TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

PROGRAM (1992).
132. See Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 939 F2d 696,698-99 (1991)
(Nollan not applicable because developer had entered into settlement voluntarily, parties
negotiated in good faith, and the settlement was supported by consideration). Although, in
Leroy, the court was deciding whether to apply the holding in Nollan retroactively to a
settlement agreement, the decision is certainly indicative of a willingness to grant more
deference when land use regulation is accepted voluntarily. See id. TDR program designers
would be wise to fashion programs in a manner that is not rigidly unilateral and provides
landowners with some alternative avenue to proceed with development plans if the TDR
program is viewed by the developer as wholly unacceptable.
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2. TDR Exactions Pass the "Essential Nexus" and "Rough Proportionality"
Tests
If a court rejects arguments that TDR exactions do not need to be
subjected to the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" tests, TDR
defendants may still succeed in arguing that TDR exactions pass the tests.
Courts have been willing to find that development exactions pass the
heightened scrutiny tests under a variety of circumstances.' A factor
particularly beneficial to TDR defenses is that when the exaction does not
involve ahysical invasion, it is possible to give Nollan and Dolan relaxed
readings. Monetary property rights do not raise the same level of concern
as the physical appropriations in Nollan and Dolan and so the need for
constraint on the police power is lessened." Therefore, even where TDR
exactions share a less than ideal relationship with the state interests they
advance in receiving zones, they may still share a sufficient nexus and
proportionality.
Little is certain about what exactly will fill the requirements of the
Nollan and Dolan tests, since the current analysis varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. In Commercial Builders of Northern Cal. v. City of Sacramento,the
Ninth Circuit upheld a monetary exaction where the city hired an outside
consulting firm to study the legitimacy of the state's interest and determine
the appropriate fee level that would advance the interest." Thus, having
an independent study that states the connection between restricting
development in a receiving zone and protecting open space in a sending

133. See, e.g., Commercial Builders of Northern Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872,
875 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S.931 (1992); Azul Pacifico, Inc.v. Los Angeles, 948 F.2d
575, 583 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on othergrounds, 973 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1081 (1993); Adolph v. FEMA, 854 F.2d 732,737-38 (5th Cir. 1988); Sudarsky v. New York,
779 F. Supp. 287,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aftd,969 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1084 (1993), reh'g denied, 507 US. 980 (1993); Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d
604,616 (9th Cir. 1990); Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172,178
(4th Cir. 1988); Garneau v. City of Seattle, 897 F. Supp. 1318, 1325-26 (W.D. Wash. 1995);

McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 F. Supp. 604,606-07 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
134. See, e.g., Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874-76 (rejecting the argument that
monetary exactions should fall under the same analysis as physical takings). Cf. Ehrlich v.
Culver City, 911 P.2d 429,439 (Cal. 1996), cert. denied, 519 US. 929 (1996).
135. See Ehrlich,911 P.2d at 439 ('iTlhe heightened standard of scrutiny is triggered by a
relatively narrow class of land use cases-those exhibiting circumstances which increase the

risk that the local permitting authority will seek to avoid the obligation to pay just
compensation.").
136.

Commercial Builders of Northern Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d at 837. But see

William J.0ack) Jones Ins. Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912,914 (W.D. Ark. 1990)
(rejecting testimony of expert civil engineer alleging that construction of convenience store
will create additional burdens on public street and finding exaction requiring dedication of

expanded right-of-way constituted a taking).
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zone provides a good start to defending the nexus test. The necessary level
of study beyond this may vary. In Sudarsky v. New York, a New York
District Court held that an environmental impact study was not necessary
to adequately demonstrate a nexus between state interest and a development exaction requiring dedication of a transit easement.' Obviously, the
more detailed the study and the closer the relationship the better.
Similarly, a detailed economic analysis of the TDR market will be
necessary to pass the "rough proportionality" test and show that developers are not being forced to pay too much for TDRs.' If some type of strong
connection is shown between the sending zones and the receiving zones,
a TDR market that is designed to compensate the restrictions upon the
sending zone landowners by removing the windfall bestowed upon the
receiving zone landowners will hold a strong presumption of validity.'
Although a concrete connection between the TDR price and the development impact might not exist, a well-constructed market will not result in
the receiving zone landowner bearing any extra burden in order to advance
the public welfare.
Finally, a legislatively enacted plan that predetermines set formulas
for transfers of development rights will add to the validity of a program
under heightened scrutiny. Such a program will eliminate the individuality
of exaction determinations and will spread relatively similar burdens over
larger numbers of people. Additional safeguards could include procedures
for appeals of permit decisions and recourse for landowners that may be
unduly burdened due to unfavorable market conditions."® Generally, any
component of a TDR program that aims to protect receiving zone landowners from bearing too much of the burden associated with advancing a
public benefit will add to the constitutional credibility of a program under
the Nollan and Dolan analysis.

137. Sudarsky v. New York, 779 F. Supp. 287,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 969 F.2d 1041 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084 (1993), reh'gdenied, 507 U.S. 980 (1993).

138. The keystone to the "rough proportionality" argument will always be that the
exaction is not overly burdensome on the receiving zone landowner. A TDR sdheme will have
serious difficulty proving a concrete connection between TDR price and development impact,

but Dolanprobably does not require such concreteness so long as the developer is not overly
burdened. When designing a program, planners must be aware of how outside organizations
such as conservation organizations or other government agencies may impact the TDR
market. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 US. 374 (1994).

139. The economics of TDR schemes are far too complex to simply perform this function,
but given the large number of variables inherently present in valuing land, a TDR should be
nearly as accurate and efficient as any other system. See Berry & Steiker, supra note 38, at 57-

59.
140. Generally, these will be procedural due process concerns of any zoning ordinance.
Procedural due process claims are beyond the scope of this article.
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In summation, TDR exactions may be challenged under the
Takings Clause, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's recent rulings
in Nollan and Dolan. However, a well-designed program should be capable
of surviving such challenges. The primary objective of any defense to these
claims should be, first, to argue that Nollan and Dolan are not applicable to
the type of exactions found in TDR programs. This may be done by arguing
that the decisions (1) only apply to exactions that amount to physical
appropriations of property; (2) only apply to individualized determinations
and not legislatively enacted programs; and/or (3) only apply to unilateral
government programs and not voluntary participation programs. If
successful, the heightened scrutiny analysis of Nollan and Dolan will not
apply to the TDR exactions and they will pass constitutional muster. If, in
the alternative, the court does apply heightened scrutiny, an equitable TDR
program that is well supported by independent economic analysis and
does not create an exaction that is unduly burdensome on receiving zone
landowners should be capable of surviving a takings challenge.
At this point, one might ask why bother with TDR exactions if it is
so difficult to construct them within the confines of Nollan and Dolan?From
a policy standpoint, the answer lies in the effect of the marketplace on land
development. Allowing exactions to be controlled to some degree by the
market promotes more efficient land use. When TDR prices rise, landowners are strongly encouraged to make more efficient use of their land to
maximize returns on their investment. The end result for the public at large
is that more efficient land use is achieved. In the process the landowners
capable of achieving the highest returns will likely bear the costs, simply
because they are willing to pay more for development rights. These
landowners will bear a heavier burden of paying for the public benefit But,
there is nothing novel about this type of vertical equity. Our current income
tax scheme is structured in a very similar way. Such sacrifices are
acceptable to promote the general welfare in ways that everyone gains and,
dearly, we are learning that everyone can gain by more efficient land use.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTING
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS IN SENDING ZONES
A.

Regulatory Takings Law

Deciding how to evaluate sending zone development restrictions
in a takings context is a difficult question. The primary issue is whether the
restrictions placed on landowners in the sending zone constitute a taking.
The Supreme Court has found a per se taking to occur whenever regula-
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tions force a landowner to suffer a physical invasion of his property.14 1
However, most zoning ordinances are justified by the government's police
power when asserted to protect the public welfare.l' Only if a "regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 1I The Court has developed
at least four different tests for deciding when a taking occurs, without
providing specific guidance for when one test should be applied in place
of another.'" One approach applies a two-part test for determining if a
regulatory taking has occurred. First, the Court determines whether the
regulation advances a legitimate state interest, a test that is applied with
minimal scrutiny. Second, the Court determines whether the landowner
has been denied all economically beneficial uses of his land, a test that
involves an ad hoc factual inquiry. '
The Supreme Court has dealt repeatedly with takings claims
arising out of land-use regulation and has typically granted a high degree
of deference to state interests when deciding such claims. In Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court recognized that zoning ordinances
to control development advance legitimate state interests.' The Court
further legitimized the role of zoning in Agins v. City of Tlburon.' In Agins,
the Court found that a city zoning ordinance severely limiting the ability
of appellants to develop their land did not constitute a taking where the
ordinances were designed to slow development and preserve open spaces
in the city of Tiburon in an effort to protect its residents from the "ill-effects
of urbanization."' The Court found the benefits and burdens of the
ordinances were shared by the community as a whole, and, in assessing
whether the ordinances amounted to a taking, the benefits had to be
considered along with any burdens on the value of the land. 4 Additionally, Tiburon's ordinances did not completely ban development."s° Thus,
the zoning ordinances did not deprive the landowner of all economic uses
of the land.
The holding in Agins signals that land-use regulation aimed at
controlling growth and development is facially valid as advancing

141. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1015 (1992).
142. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,387 (1926).
143. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US. 393,415 (1922).
144. See Andrea L Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying PrinciplesPartI-A
Critiqueof CurrentTakings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL L. REV. 1299,1304 (1989).
145. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 US. 374,385 (1994) (quoting Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 US. 255,260 (1980)); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 US.
470,485(1987).
146. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
147. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 US. 255 (1980).
148. See id. at 261.
149. See id. at 262.
150. See id.
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legitimate state interests. Agins also requires that when calculating the
burden to private landowners, courts must perform an environmental
accounting that includes benefits of land-use regulation as well as costs.5
Finally, the holding demonstrates that zoning restrictions that do not
entirely eliminate development may more easily survive a constitutional
challenge than programs that require sending zones to remain in their
natural, undisturbed state.
The second factor in determining whether a taking has occurred
requires examination of the degree to which the regulation has denied a
landowner's economic use of his property. A regulatory taking occurs
where a "regulation goes too far" in denying an owner economic use of her
land. I This determination is not nearly as simple as it may seem. In Penn
Central,the Court stated when "engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries" the Court's decisions should consider "[tihe economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations."'
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,the Court restated
this inquiry to include consideration of economic impact of the regulation,
interference with the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations,
and the character of the government action."
More recently, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'" the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the takings issue in the context of
South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act. The Act prohibited
beachfront development on Lucas's property in an effort to preserve an
ecologically fragile beach/dune system." The Court reversed the South
Carolina Supreme Court's finding that the restrictions were a permissible
exercise of the state's police power and did not constitute a taking. The
Court declared that a per se taking occurs where regulation of land has
resulted in denial of "all economically beneficial or productive use of
land." ' The Court's per se takings rule is only overcome where "inquiry
into the nature of the owner's estate shows the proscribed use interests

151. See id. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US. 393, 415 (1922), Justice Holmes
referred to this as the "reciprocity of advantage." In Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v.
DeBenedictis, 480 US. 470, 491 (1987), Justice Stevens explains Holmes' concept, stating

"[u]nder our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of preserving the public
weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of their property. While each of us is
burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that
are placed on others."

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Pennsylvania Coal,260 U.S. at 415.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 US. 104,124 (1978).
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,495 (1987).
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1007-09 (1992).
See id. at 1007-09.
See id. at 1015.
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were not part of his title to begin with."' The majority in Lucas would not
seem to find a taking where some beneficial or economic use is retained in
the land, however minimal.'" The Court pointed out that it was not
imposing a strict categorical denial of takings protection to landowners

suffering anything less than a one hundred percent dimunition in property

value.' 60
Facially, Lucas restates the limit on the government's ability to use
its police power to regulate land-use when such regulation denies the
owner "all economically beneficial or productive use of land."161 In reality,
the holding is probably less limiting than the language implies, since the
majority acknowledges the evolving nature of state environmental law by
stating that "changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what
was previously permissible no longer so."" In sum, Lucas dictates that
where a State possesses the power to regulate under state law at the time
of the landowner's purchase, it may do so without fear of causing an
unconstitutional taking. But, where the landowner has the right at the time
of purchase, the State must regulate strictly within the constraints of
takings law.
An ancillary issue that arises when a regulation only affects an
individual strand in the bundle of rights or only affects portions of a total
parcel of land is how to choose a denominator for the takings equation.'
The denominator for calculating the dimunition in value may consist only
of the portion of land being regulated or it may consist of some larger piece
that holds substantial residual value independent of the regulated
portion.' In Penn Central,the Court stated that "'[taking's jurisprudence
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the
action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole."" In Andrus v.Allard, the Court elaborated that "[alt
158. See id. at 1027. In other words, the State's police power must originate in existing state
law of property or nuisance.
159. See id. at 1019. But see Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560,
1568-73 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 US. 1109 (1995) (rejecting a bright-line rule for less
than total takings).
160. See Lucas, 505 US. at 1019 n.8.
161. Id. at 1015.
162. See id. at 1031.
163. The takings equation may be stated as follows Diminution in value = (value of land
before regulation - value of land after regulation) + Total value of land.
164. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171,1180 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
165. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 US. 104,130-31 (1978); accordKeystone
Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 US. 470,497 (1987).
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least where an owner possesses the full 'bundle' of property rights, the
destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."1' The Supreme Court has both
endorsed&' and criticizeds the single parcel theory in subsequent
decisions.
Lower courts have taken different approaches to the denominator
issue. In FloridaRock Industries,Inc. v. United States,1 " the Federal Circuit
suggested that partial regulatory takings should be compensated in the
same way that exercises of eminent domain power are compensated. Under
the Federal Circuit's analysis, when the government completely takes a
strand from the bundle of rights, the party harmed should be entitled to
compensation for the partial taking.1" This represents a divergence from
the single parcel theory in Penn Centraland Andrus. The Federal Circuit
followed this partial takings approach several months later in Loveladies
Harbor,Inc. v. United States.'n In affirming the trial court's finding that a
developer had suffered a taking on a 12.5 acre parcel, the court divided a
developer's 250 acre lot into three separate parcels, the smallest of which
was the 12.5 acres containing 11.5 acres of wetlands subject to regulation'r
The court rationalized the division on the fact that 199 acres had been sold
before wetlands regulations were applicable, and of the remaining 51 acres,
development rights to 38.5 acres had been dedicated to the state of New
Jersey as part of a settlement for a state permit to develop the remaining
12.5 acres.' Thus, it is unclear how much of a divergence from Penn

166. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,65-66 (1979); accor Keystone, 480 US. at 497.
167. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust
for Southern Cal, 508 U.S. 602,644 (1993) (reaffirming the analysis adopted in Penn Centra);

Keystone, 480 US. 470,497 (1987).
168. See, e.g., Luas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (characterizing the formulation in Penn Centralas

"an extreme-and, we think, unsupportable-view of the relevant calculus").
169. Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 513 US. 1109 (199S).
170. See id. at 1568-73.
171. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
172. See id. at 1180-83. The Ninth Circuit seems to have suggested a similarly flexible
approach to the denominator analysis specifically in the context of TDRs. Without reaching
a decision on the issue, the Ninth Circuit, in Amenmr Savings & Laan Assoc. v.County ofMarin,

suggested using the criteria from eminent domain severance damage proceedings for

determining whether a parcel should be divided for takings analysis. American Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. County of Main, 653 F.2d 364,369 (9th Cir. 1981). These criteria consist of (1)
physical contiguity; (2) unity of ownership; and (3)unity of use. Id. (citations omitted); accord
Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 35 Fed. CL.232, 239 (1996); Ciampetti v.
United States, 22 CL.Ct. 310,318 (1991); Riviera Beach v. Shillingburg, 659 So.2d 1174,1183
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
173. Loveladie Harbor,28 F.3d at 1180-83.
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Central'ssingle parcel theory Loveladies Harboractually represents.17 While
the exact position of takings jurisprudence on the denominator issue is
unclear, most courts have followed the single parcel theory of Penn Central
without much modification."5
B. Application of Takings Law to Sending Zones
What does all of this mean in the context of TDRs? Euclid and Agins
tell us that it is permissible for the government to exercise its police power
in the form of zoning ordinances to protect environmental resources. Penn
Centraland Keystone tell us that when the government exercise of the police
power goes too far in interfering with economic use of the land, the action
constitutes a taking that must be compensated. Lucas tells us that where
government exercise of the police power results in deprivation of all
economic uses of land, the action constitutes a per se taking if the landowner previously possessed the right to use the land in the manner
proscribed by the regulation. Although, the exact impact of Lucas remains
uncertain, it signifies a shift within the Court toward increased protection
of private landowners' rights that could jeopardize many land-use
regulations aimed at protecting environmental resources.17'
In Loveladies Harbor,the Federal Circuit restated the takings test in
light of Lucas:
With regard to the interest alleged to be taken, there has
been a regulatory taking if:
(1) there was a denial of economically viable use of the
property as a result of the regulatory imposition;

174. Loveladies Harborcan be harmonized with Penn Central on the basis that the developer
in Loveladies Harbor had effectively relinquished title to all but the 12.5-acre parcel. Therefore,
the developer was not in defacto possession of the larger parcels.
175. See, e.g., Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1577 (10th Cir. 1995)
(diminution in value of full bundle of rights must serve as the denominator for takings
analysis rather than just denial of right to hunt); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F3d 796,
802 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (refusing to divide plaintiffs combined parcel into portion containing
regulated wetlands and portion free of wetlands regulation); Marshall v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 912 F.Supp. 1456,1472-73 (D. Wyo. 1996) (diminution to value of parcels of land
as a whole must serve as the denominator in takings analysis rather than diminution in value
of individual parcels); Kamm v. State Dep't Env't Protection, 705 A.2d 1221,1227 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1998) (denominator consists of landowners "contiguous acreage in the same
ownership"); Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528,532-33 (Wis. 1996) (entire 10.4 acres
of plaintiff's property used as denominator, even though only 8.2 acre parcel was subject to
regulation).
176. See, e.g., David L Callies, Taking the Taking Issue into the Tenty-st Century, in Affn
LUCAS: LAND USE RGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WrTHOUT COMPENSA77ON 1, 9
(David L Callies ed., 1993).
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(2) the property owner had distinct investment-backed
expectations; and
(3) it was an interest vested in the owner, as a matter of state
property law, and not within the power of the state to
regulate under common law nuisance doctrine."
Applying the test from Loveladies Harborto TDRs is not easy. TDRs
defy most theoretical classifications. They have characteristics of both an
abstract right and of compensation for the denied use of a right. This
creates a controversy over how TDRs should fit into takings analysis.
Should TDRs be considered as a regulatory benefit bestowed upon the land
and mitigating the dimunition in value of zoning restrictions? Or, should
dimunition in value be decided independent of TDRs, in which case TDRs
enter the analysis only to determine if just compensation has been provided
when a taking is found?
1. The BrennanApproach
Most courts have adopted the former method of analysis and have
considered TDRs as an economic use existing with the land, thus mitigating the effects of regulation. The TDR is seen as a benefit conferred on the
land by the regulation. The Supreme Court used this approach in Penn
Central,upholding a New York City TDR program for the preservation of
historic landmarks. 1 Penn Central owned the historic Grand Central
Terminal and several surrounding properties in New York City.'"Under
New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law, Penn Central was
prohibited from developing the air space above the terminal, but was given
TDRs that could be applied to the surrounding properties it owned.' In
determining that the denial of development rights for the Grand Central
property did not constitute a taking, Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, determined that the TDRs allocated to Penn Central should be
"taken into account in considering the impact of regulation."- Brennan
states that "to the extent appellants have been denied the right to build
above the Terminal, it is not literally accurate to say that they have been
denied all use of even those pre-existing air rights. Their ability to use these
rights has not been abrogated; they are made transferable to at least eight
parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal."' The Court examined the
dimunition in value of all of Penn Central's parcels and rejected the

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Loveladies Harbor,28 F.3d 1171,1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
See id. at 115.
See id.
See id.
at 137.
See id.
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proposition that the property could be divided into discrete sections for
analysis."e The Court also considered the fact that Penn Central was
allowed to continue operating Grand Central Terminal, suggesting that the
company had not been denied a "reasonable return" on its investment.rn
Penn Central is a critical decision for TDR programs because it
allows the projected value of TDRs to be placed on the takings side of the
analysis. Under Brennan's analysis, so long as a legitimate state interest is
found consistent with Agins, TDRs are counted as an economic use retained
in the land, making it more difficult to find an unconstitutional taking. The
Court reached this result in a very cursory manner and does not go to any
great lengths to support or explain their treatment of TDRs.'" This may
have been due to the relatively simple and individualized nature of the
TDRs being given to Penn Central. At any rate, the superficial treatment of
TDRs leaves the Court's approach ill-defined and slightly ambiguous.
State courts have generally followed Agins and Penn Centralwhen
determining the constitutionality of TDR programs. In City of Hollywood v.
Hollywood, Inc.,l" a Florida District Court of Appeal upheld a city zoning
ordinance that restricted beachfront lots to single-family dwellings and
granted the owner TDRs that could be applied to adjacent lots to increase
permissible density.' s The ordinances were designed to alleviate traffic
congestion and preserve the local area's last remaining undeveloped beach
area.'" The lots at issue were located within an otherwise heavily developed beachfront. The court approved of the ordinance, stating rather
emotionally: "Before us is the last unspoiled beach area on the Gold Coast,
a veritable Shangri-La in an otherwise endless Himalayan mountain range
of cement to the south. It is surely a laudable governmental purpose to
restrain excessive hotel and apartment house building on it and it is neither
arbitrary nor capricious to do so."' Applying the analysis-of Penn Central,
the court found that the TDRs provided a significant economic use for
other parcels of the plaintiff's land.1' The court classified the TDR program
as a permissible game of "carrot-and-stick" played by the government and
land developers all the time.191

183. See id. at 130-31.
184. See id. at 136.
185. See id. at 137.
186. City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
review denied, 441 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1983).
187. Id. at 1333.
188. See id. at 1334.
189. Id. at 1335.
190. See id. at 1337-38.
191. See id. at 1338.
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In another Florida case, Glisson v. Alachua County,1" a different
District Court of Appeals upheld a TDR program designed to protect
threatened wetlands. The court endorsed environmental protection as a
legitimate state interest and held that the regulations did not deny all
economic or beneficial uses of the land. The court elaborated that "because
the regulations permit most existing uses of the property, and provide a
mechanism whereby individual landowners may obtain a variance or
transfer of development rights, the regulations on their face do not deny
individual landowners all economically viable uses of their property.""
Approaching takings challenges to TDR programs in much the
same manner, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Gardner v.New Jersey
PinelandsCommission,1 addressed the.constitutionality of TDRs as used in
the Comprehensive Management Plan of the New Jersey Pinelands. The
New Jersey Plan was designed to preserve sensitive ecological and
agricultural systems and protect critical drinking water supplies in
southern New Jersey." The plan strictly limited residential development
on Gardner's land and required that all remaining land be limited to its
current agricultural and related uses. The plan granted Gardner TDRs in
the form of development credits, which could be sold to landowners in less
restricted zones." In upholding the New Jersey Plan, the court categorically endorsed the plan's regulations as advancing legitimate state
interests.'W Citing to the New Jersey Constitution and the Legislature, the
court stated that "[tihe preservation of agriculture and farmland constitutes
a valid governmental goal... [and] [tihe Act further advances a valid public
purpose by preventing or reducing harm to the public. That is exemplified
most dramatically by its measures to safeguard the environment and
protect the water supply by severely limiting development."' Applying
Penn Central'sanalysis, the court found that the plan did not eliminate all
economic uses of the land or interfere with "distinct investment-backed
expectations." 1"

192. Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied,
570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990).
193. Id. at 1037.
194. Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251,253 (N.J.1990). A similar
takings claim was brought against the New Jersey Plan in Federal Court, but the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals abstained from deciding the issue based on the Pullman Doctrine. See
Hovsons, Inc. v. Secretary of the Interior, 519 F. Supp. 434,450-51 (D.N.J. 1981), affd, 711 F.2d
1208 (3d Cir. 1983).
195. See Gardner,593 A.2d at 254.
196. See id. at 261.
197. See id. at 257.
198. Id. at 257-58.
199. Id.at 261.
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Based on Hollywood, Glisson, and Gardner,it would seem that courts
have embraced TDR programs with open arms and the constitutional
validity of such programs is of little concern. However, a New York state
court decision prior to Penn Centralreveals the inherent tension that exists
over how to deal with TDR programs. In FredF.FrenchInvesting Co. v. City
of New York,= the Court of Appeals of New York struck down a New York
City TDR scheme that designated a portion of Tudor City as a public park
and granted the landowners TDRs usable elsewhere in the city. The court
dismissed the plaintiff's takings claims on the basis that the government
did not actually appropriate the property, 0 but the court did review the
validity of the New York City scheme to determine whether it was a valid
exercise of the police power.= The court held the zoning amendment was
"unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional because, without due
process of law, it deprive[d] the owner of all his property rights, except the
bare title and a dubious future reversion of full use."m In making this
determination the court did not consider the value of the TDRs attached to
the lots. The court refused to do so because there was no designated
receiving zone for the rights. ' The court found that it was a "tolerable
abstraction to consider the development rights apart from the solid land,"
but the current scheme created an intolerable "double abstraction" because
the receiving zone had yet to be identified, acquired, and approved. ' The
court did not feel the TDRs carried any economic value until attached to
tangible real property. 0 The court explicitly endorsed the analysis that
Brennan would later adopt in Penn Centralby speaking of development
rights as a "transferable commodity" that "may not be disregarded in
determining whether the ordinance has destroyed the economic value of
the underlying property. "' However, the court simultaneously acknowledged that TDRs have no independent economic value and their value is
wholly derived from a separate and distinct parcel of land.

200. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976), cert.

dened, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
201.

Id. at 386. The area in dispute was already a park. Plaintiff purchased the area and

announced plans to erect a 50-story building where the park was located. In response, the City
Planning Commission passed a special amendment designating the area a "special parks
district" and requiring that the parks be open to the public from 6:00 AM to 10:00 PM daily. Id.
at 38384. However, the city never acquired title to the parks or physically occupied the parks,
so the court did not feet a takings claim was sustainable. Id. at 386.
202. Id. at 386.
203. Id. at 387.
204. See id. at 387-88.

205. Id.at 388.
206. See id.
207. 1d. at 387.
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Theoretically, the Frenchopinion seems hard to reconcile. The court
wanted to treat the TDRs as attaching economic value to the regulated
parcel of land, but was forced to admit that no economic connection exists
between the two without a specifically designated receiving zone. The
difficulties experienced by the court in French demonstrate the schizophrenic nature of TDRs. While the TDR conferred on the regulated parcel
of land may carry with it economic value only redeemable by that parcel's
owner, the actual value of the TDR derives from wholly independent
potential economic uses elsewhere. In essence, when a receiving zone
landowner purchases TDRs, she compensates the sending zone landowner
for a loss of economic use. In this light, TDRs appear to be much more like
a form of just compensation.
2. The Rehnquist Approach.
Although most courts have treated TDRs as a factor in deciding the
dimunition in land value caused by land use regulation, the decision in
French suggests that an alternative approach to the takings issue exists
when TDRs are involved. In the dissent to Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist
elaborates on this alternative approach by considering the takings issue
independent of TDRs. Under Rehnquist's approach, TDRs only receive
consideration as just compensation where a taking is found to occur.
Rehnquist approaches TDRs with great skepticism, citing the problems of
Frenchwhile declaring that the "uncertain and contingent market value"
of TDRs makes it highly unlikely that they would provide Penn Central
with just compensation.210
Similarly, the Arizona Court of Appeals, in Corrigan v. City of
Scottsdale, followed Rehnquist's dissent and held that a TDR plan creating
a conservation area of permanent natural open spaces resulted in a taking
without just compensation.2 11 The Scottsdale plan rezoned the area around
the McDowell Mountains into either conservation or development zones.
Development was essentially proscribed in the conservation zones, and, in
return, landowners received TDRs that could be used in the development
zones.212 Corrigan owned 4,800 acres of land in the area, of which
approximately 74 percent was designated as a conservation zone.1 In
Corrigan,the court specifically addressed the issue of whether the use of

208. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 US. 104,138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
209. See id. at 150-52.
210. Id. at 151.
211. Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), affd on other
grounds, 720 P.2d 513 (Ariz. 1986).
212. See id. at 531-32.
213. See id.
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TDRs "to preserve open space is an exercise of the police power or of the
power of eminent domain."214 The court determined that the plan was not
a valid exercise of police power because it did not act to prevent a
"substantial threat to public safety."215 The court then found, without
mentioning TDRs, that the plan had deprived Corrigan of any use of the
main portion of her land."6 The court held that Scottsdale's plan failed both
prongs of the takings test-it did not advance a legitimate state interest and
it deprived Corrigan of all uses of her land. By not mentioning TDRs in the
second prong of the analysis, the court partially adopted Rehnquist's
rationale. The court backed away from explicitly endorsing the Rehnquist
approach by recognizing the duality of TDR schemes. The court's
trepidation over placing TDRs exclusively within either the police power
or the eminent domain power was apparent. The court observed the
following:
[ijn the context of the case before us we are faced with an
ordinance which is an attempted hybrid between police
power and eminent domain. The city claims this action is a
legitimate exercise of police power and yet it attempts a form
of compensation by way of transfer of density credits. If this
there would be no need
were a valid exercise of police power
21 7
for any form of compensation.
However, the court reaches the same result as Rehnquist by stating
that the basic issue left to be decided is "whether fair compensation can be
given by transferring development rights." 2 8 Yet, under the Arizona
Constitution compensation must "be made by payment of money in an

214. Id. at 536.
215. Id. Corrigan never asserted on appeal or at the trial level that the zoning ordinance
did not substantially advance legitimate state interests. The trial court did find that the
ordinance was "reasonably related to public health, safety, morals, and general welfare." Id.
at 533. However, on appeal, the court applies a more demanding standard to strike down the
ordinance under this prong of the test. Corrigan,720 P.2d at 515-18. This seems to be in direct
conflict with the Supreme Court's application of the rational basis standard in Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (holding that "[scenic] zoning ordinances substantially
advance legitimate governmental goals").
216. Corrigan,720 P.2d at 539. The court also later states this explicitly: "In the case before
us it is clear that the Hillside Ordinance prevents any development whatsoever on the largest
parcel of Corrigan's land. This is a taking." Id. at 539. However, a factual examination of the
case reveals that evaluated as a whole, Corrigan's land would have only experienced a
decrease in value of approximately 50% at most. See id. Although, it was not disputed that
Corrigan's property lying in the conservation zone would be worth nothing. See id.
217. Id. at 538.
218. Id.
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amount that has been judicially determined," 219 and, therefore, the court
held TDRs cannot constitute fair compensation without further analysis.
The Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of TDRs in Suitum
v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency.'m Suitum dealt with a land management
plan for the Lake Tahoe region of Nevada. The plan severely limited
development in certain areas and granted TDRs to the negatively affected
landowners."1 Under the plan, Suitum's entire parcel of land was placed
in a "Stream Environment Zone" (SEZ), which meant that "'[n]o additional
land coverage or other permanent land distubance"'was permitted on the
parceLt As such, Suitum's lot was valued at between $7,125 and $16 ,750 ,12
and Suitum was allocated several different types of TDRs that had a total
market value of between $35,598 and $44,696.?
Suitum brought a suit alleging that by "denying her the right to
construct a house on her lot, the agency's [Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency] restrictions deprived her of 'all reasonable and economically
viable use' of her property, and so amounted to a taking of her property
without just compensation." m The District Court found Suitum's claim
unripe for adjudication because she had not formally applied for a permit
to build and, additionally, the value of the TDRs was still too speculative
to allow the court to accurately decide a takings issue.' The lower courts
implicitly assumed TDRs would be applied to the takings side of the
analysis if the issue was adjudicated. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.W
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Souter, writing for the
majority, addressed only the ripeness issue of the case, explicitly stating the
holding did not address on which side of the constitutional analysis TDRs
should be placed.' The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, finding Suitum's

219. Id. at 540 (citing ARZ. CONSr. art. H, § 17).
220. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 US. 725 (1997).

221. See id. at 727-732.
222. Id. at 739.
223. See id. at 732.
224. See id. Suitun was immediately granted a Residential Development Right and was
entitled to up to three more, each having a market value between $1,500 and $2,500.
Additionally, she was given Land Coverage Rights having a market value between $1,098 and
$2,196. Finally, Suitum could apply for a Residential Allocation, which, if sold with a
Residential Development Right, had a market value of between $30,000 and $35,000. Id.
225. Id. at 731.
226. See id. at 732-33.
227. See id. at 733.
228. See id. at 728. At least one court has read the majority's decision as an endorsement
of the Brennan approach from Penn Central. In Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81,108 (1997),
the Court of Federal Claims addressed an argument by the plaintiff that TDRs were to be
considered on the just compensation side of takings analysis by stating "the Supreme Court
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claim ripe on the basis that the SEZ designation constituted a final
determination concerning her right to use her land and that "[tihe
valuation of Suitum's TDRs is therefore simply an issue of fact about
possible market prices, and one on which the District Court had considerable evidence before it.",
Although the majority refrained from addressing how TDRs
should be treated in takings analysis, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Thomas and O'Connor in concurrence, addressed the issue in detail. Scalia
concurred in the majority's opinion because he felt the value of the TDRs
was completely irrelevant to the issue of whether a taking had occurred.
Scalia strongly endorsed Rehnquist's approach of placing TDRs on the just
compensation side of the analysis, stating,
TDRs, of course, have nothing to do with the use or development of the land to which they are (by regulatory decree)
"attached." The right to use and develop one's own land is
quite distinct from the right to confer upon someone else an
increased power to use and develop his land. The latter is
valuable, to be sure, but it is a new right conferred upon the
landowner in exchange for the taking, rather than a reduction
of the taking. In essence, the TDR permits the landowner
whose right to use and develop his property has been
extinguished to extract money from others. Just as cash
payment from the government would not relate to whether
regulation "goes too far" (i.e., restricts use of the land so
severely as to constitute a taking), but rather to whether
there
0
has been adequate compensation for the taking.n
Scalia compared the TDR to a "chit or coupon" that simply shifts
the responsibility of compensation away from the government and onto
other landowners. 1 Scalia then labeled the Ninth Circuit's application of
the Brennan approach as "a clever, albeit transparent, device that seeks to

in Suitum reaffirmed the relevance of TDRs to determining takings liability." The Good court
later re-emphasizes this belief when denying the plaintiff's position:
While the concurring Justices in Suitu clearly indicate opposition to this
proposition, their opinion underscores the Court's reaffirnance of the Penn
Central holding that the value of TDRs is to be considered to answer the
threshold question of whether a taking has occurred. Accordingly, plaintiff's
legal challenge to the consideration of TDRs in this case is rejected.
Id. However, this conclusion is tenuous at best, since the majority was very specific in stating
that their decision did not decide this issue.
229. Suitum, 520 US. at 741.

230.

Id. at 747.

231.

See id.
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take advantage of a peculiarity of our takings clause jurisprudence."'
Scalia observed that the major flaw in the Brennan approach is that
"[where] money that the government-regulator gives to the
landowner can be counted [toward] the question of whether
there is a taking (causing the courts to say the land retains
substantial value, and has thus not been taken), rather than
on the question of whether the compensation for the taking
is adequate, the government can get away with paying much
less."=
Scalia distinguishes Penn Centralon the basis that the TDRs in Penn
Centralwere internally usable by them on surrounding properties that they
already owned. Penn Central's aggregated parcels, when considered as
a whole, had not diminished in value and, therefore, the TDRs were
correctly factored into the assessment of the impacts of the regulation.'
Scalia explicitly states that if not distinguishable on this basis, Brennan's
analysis would deserve to be overruled. Scalia reiterates that the relevant
issue in the takings context is the "extent to which use or development of
the land has been restricted. " 'u Finally, Scalia acknowledges TDRs as
serving a "commendable purpose" in mitigating economic losses caused
by land use regulation, and he dearly endorses their use to fulfill all or part
of the just compensation requirement of the Constitution.'
C. Analysis: Is Penn Centrala Relic in the Storm?
The cases above present two plausible, but extremely different
approaches to takings challenges involving TDRs. Although the Supreme
Court adopted the Brennan approach when it last addressed the TDR issue,
more recent decisions have signified fundamental changes in the Court's
takings jurisprudence. The three-member block in justice Scalia's concurrence raises questions about the suitability of Brennan's approach in Penn
Centralwhen applied to externally traded TDRs. The following discussion
briefly analyzes the Brennan and Rehnquist approaches and concludes that
the Rehnquist approach is based on a more convincing constitutional
analysis and should be adopted for externally traded TDRs.

232. Id. at 748.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 749.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. See id.
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1. The BrennanApproach: A Train without Tracks
When considering a regulatory takings issue involving TDRs, the
Court examines the economic impact of the regulation at hand, interference
with the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the government action. Under Brennan's approach, TDRs are
considered to confer economic value upon the land. That is, TDRs are
considered as one of the strands in the bundle of property rights belonging
to the landowner. When viewed as a property right with economic value,
TDRs carry substantial monetary value as long as the planning bodies are
successful at maintaining market integrity.2 0 In this fashion, planners can
use the TDRs' value alone to overcome takings challenges to zoning
programs.
Evaluated in this way, TDRs grant planning bodies enhanced
freedom to exercise the police power and TDR programs are given a high
degree of legal certainty that can foster increased confidence in the TDR
marketplace. Landowners in sending zones are at least partially compensated for their sacrifices and land planners can achieve their goals with
relatively little constitutional hindrance. Additionally, the Brennan
approach may significantly decrease the transaction costs of TDR programs
because programs do not have to pay as much attention to detailed
analysis of price structures in order to avoid takings claims, nor will as
many claims be brought where the outcome is favorably weighted toward
the government. The constitutional constraints are loose enough to allow
planners to construct the most efficient programs possible, thereby cutting
transaction costs and achieving environmental objectives. Thus, the
Brennan analysis may seem very advantageous to land planners.
However, a close analysis of the approach reveals several
shortcomings that negate these advantages. First, from a theoretical
perspective, treating TDRs as an economic use of property is unsound.
Courts have repeatedly found TDRs difficult to correctly classify and have
attached classifications with little consistency. 1 One major problem is that

239. For a good discussion of how these factors are applied, see Creppel v. United States,
41 F.3d 627,631-32 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
240. See Brief of Dr. James Nicholas, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 812, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (No. 96243) (discussing
existing TDR markets).
241. See, e.g., Mitsui Fudosan (US.A.), Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 219 Cal. App. 3d 525
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (TDRs are real property and are properly considered as a portion of
property to which they are attached for purposes of property tax assessment); Wilkinson v.
St Jude Harbors, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 576 So. 2d 295

(Fla. 1990) (TDRs are not real property subject to assessment for ad valorem taxation); Lorenc
v. Bernards Township, 5 N.J. Tax 39 (N.J. Tax Ct.1982), ard sub noam., Sage v. Bemards
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TDRs do not really hold an independent value until they are attached to a
parcel of land in a receiving zone. In French, the New York Court of
Appeals described TDRs as "disembodied abstractions of man's ingenuity,
float[ing] in a limbo until restored to reality by reattachment to tangible
real property."2 The value of TDRs is embedded in the value of the parcel
of land receiving the rights. The value of the TDR is not based on any
existing or potential economic use of the sending parceL The sending zone's
economic use is terminated, regardless of any value assigned by TDRs. As
stated in Ms. Suitum's case, "[s]he does not receive some use of her land if
TRPA gives her an option to buy Kansas real estate, 1,000 shares of GM
stock, a state lottery ticket, or a free AMTRAK pass. Use of her own land
has been permanently taken from her and TDRs are offered in compensation.""' Thus, TDRs do not confer any added use or alleviate any restrictions on current use; they simply compensate for lost potential use.
Therefore, TDRs do not confer economic use on sending zone parcels, and
it is theoretically inaccurate to place TDRs on the takings side of the
analysis.
Likewise, the argument that TDRs represent a benefit conferred
upon the land as part of a legislative enactment, and, therefore, should be
considered a mitigating factor in the takings calculus, is unsound. This
argument is as transparent as the economic use argument and can be
rejected for the same reasons. Some TDR programs may contain mitigating
factors for sending zone landowners, such as increased land value due to
more spacious and scenic zoning, and these factors should be included in
the takings calculus. But TDRs themselves represent a benefit conferred on
the land receiving the TDR after transfer out of the sending zone. The value
of the benefit is dependent on the utility of the TDR to the receiving zone
landowner. TDRs do confer a monetary benefit on the transferee upon
severance and transfer, but at no point do they confer a benefit on the
transferor. TDRs simply compensate for potential benefits removed from
the land. Since TDRs are not benefits bestowed upon the land in sending
zones, it is theoretically inaccurate to place TDRs on the takings side of the
analysis.
The Brennan approach is unsound from a policy standpoint also.
Placing TDRs on the takings side of the issue does give local planning
bodies enhanced freedom to exercise the police. power because the

Township, 6 N.J. Tax 349 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (TDRs properly assessed as part of
value of vacant land they are incident to).
242. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 388 (N.Y. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (holding a New York City TDR program unconstitutional
because the program failed to define properties where TDRs could be transferred to).
243. See Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9-10,

Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (No. 96-243).
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programs are given a high degree of constitutional deference. However,
this is a double-edged sword. Increased freedom to exercise the police
power can generate great public gains, but it can also produce very
arbitrary results. Planners are held less accountable for their actions and
may succumb to efforts to cut comers or may fall prey to individualized
political agendas. Strong incentives exist for planners to influence TDR
markets in a way that maximizes police power, but few incentives exist to
prove a corresponding maximization of public benefits.
Perhaps the most detrimental consequence of added regulatory
flexibility may be decreased marketplace security. Jerold Kayden states that
"[o]ne may analogize the government's role [in TDR markets] to that of the
Federal Reserve Board, whose manipulation of the money supply affects
interest rates and the competition for funds. When buyers and sellers have
little confidence in the predictability and stability of actions that city
officials take, then they will be less willing to forge a functioning marketplace for development rights."2" Under the Brennan approach, landowners
have less protection of their property rights and, therefore, must place
more faith in local planning bodies. The whims of such planning bodies,
armed with constitutional authority, will have severe impacts on landowners' rights. The result may be an atmosphere of distrust and antagonism
where landowners feel pitted against local planners in an effort to gain
recognition of their individual property rights. Consequently, local
planners may have increased difficulty maintaining confidence in TDR
markets and TDR programs.
In sum, placing TDRs on the economic use side of takings analysis
increases the police power of land planning agencies and may result in
some distinct advantages such as greater regulatory flexibility and reduced
transaction costs. However, the Brennan approach carries with it several
inherent flaws. Theoretically, TDRs do not confer any added use to land in
sending zones, and, therefore, factoring them into the economic impacts
side of takings analysis is unsound. Additionally, added regulatory
freedom carries with it heightened risks that local planners will abuse their
power and undermine confidence in TDR markets. As Justice Scalia
observed in Lucas, "[i]f.. .the uses of private property were subject to
unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power, 'the
natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification
more and more until at last private property disappear[ed]."' 24 Justice
Brennan's approach makes it very easy for the majority to usurp the rights

244. Kayden, supra note 18, at 578.
245. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U-S. 1003,1014 (1992) (alteration in
original) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

of the minority. His approach quickly becomes a train without tracks to
guide it.
2. The Rehnquist Approach: Acknowledging the True Natureof TDRs
Under Rehnquist's approach, TDRs are not considered an
economic use of the land and are, instead, counted only as a compensatory
tool of land use agencies. In this way, TDRs are treated as payment for a
regulatory loss. Under Rehnquist's bifurcated approach, TDRs are removed
from initial takings analysis altogether and are reinserted in just compensation analysis. First, the court must decide if sending zone restrictions have
amounted to a regulatory taking absent any TDR considerations. If the
court finds they have, it must then decide whether just compensation has
been provided for that taking.
a. Deciding If a Taking Has Occurred
The first step of the Rehnquist analysis is to determine if the
sending zone restrictions, absent any consideration of TDRs, have
amounted to a taking. Under the Rehnquist analysis some sending zone
restrictions will be more likely to result in unconstitutional takings. In
Suitum, for example, the landowner was denied her expected use of the
land, the construction of a single-family residence.' The expected use was
permissible under pre-existing state property law. Additionally, the value
of her land absent any TDRs was decreased drastically, signaling that the
zoning regulations may even rise to the level of a per se taking under
Lucas.2 7 Ms. Suitum, in fact, bore an unfair burden of the cost of preserving
Lake Tahoe's environment.24' While the goal of preserving Lake Tahoe's

246. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 US. 725,731 (1997).
247. See id. at 734.
248. Another major element to be considered in Ms. Suitum's case is that in order to sell
her TDRs and recoup the value, she is being required to record a deed restriction permanently
proscribing any possible development on her land. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the TahoeSierra Preservation Council, Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 21 n.9, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'
Planning Agency, 520 US. 725 (1997) (No. 96-243). This increases the severity of the TRPA's
restrictions and should be a factor in any judicial decision. Requiring a deed restriction makes
the government act appear even more like an exercise of eminent domain power, since the
landowner is required to make a significant change in title to the land. Absent the deed
restriction, Ms. Sultum's land could be rezoned in the future to allow some form of
development, especially if the TRPA determines that Ms. Suitum's proposed development
does not actually pose a serious environmental threat, or Ms. Suitum finds a less damaging
form of development to undertake. With the deed restriction, the land is permanently retired
from service, leaving no chance of future use. Additionally, Ms. Suitumn is still burdened with
the responsibilities of private ownership, such as taxes and liability risks. Id. at 27. Thus,
court's should view TDR programs requiring deed restrictions with some wariness in
performing a takings analysis.

Summer 19991

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

environment is certainly legitimate, as Justice Holmes stated in Pennsylvania Coal Co., "[a] strong public desire to improve the public condition [will
not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change." 9
However, the Rehnquist analysis will not always lead to an
unconstitutional taking. Not all sending zone regulation rises to the level
of the zoning ordinance in Suitum. Many times, sending zone landowners
will only be prohibited from developing above a certain density or they
will be required to maintain an existing economic use. In these situations,
the regulation may not be an unconstitutional taking. This will always be
a difficult ad hoc factual inquiry, although substantial case law exists which
can serve as guidance for land planners.'
If the regulation survives a takings claim, the land planning
agencies will be free to exercise their police powers without fear of
constitutional problems. In such cases, TDRs will only serve as a political
tool to make conservation more attractive and less burdensome on sending
zone landowners. Landowners under either the Brennan or Rehnquist
approach have less protection in this situation. However, as Justice Scalia
acknowledged in Lucas, "the property owner necessarily expects the uses
of his property to be restricted from time to time, by various measures
newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers."" 5

249. Pennsylvania CoalCo., 260 U.S. at 416.
250. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
(holding no taking had occurred where law prevented coal companies from mining less than
2% of total supply of coal); Southview Assoc. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
deeded, 507 US. 987 (1993) (holding no taking had occurred where 44 acres of an 88 acre parcel
as designated as a deeryard, thus preventing residential development); Marshall v. Board of
County Commissioners, 912 P. Supp. 1456 (D. Wyo. 1996) (holding no taking had occurred
where zoning ordinance increased minimum size for residential lots to five acres, thus
reducing developers possible number of lots from 23 to as few as 7); Rivervale Realty Co. v.
Town of Orangetown, 816 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding no taking had occurred
where zoning ordinance increased lot size requirements from one to two acres); Carpenter v.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 804 P. Supp. 1316 (D.Nev. 1992) (holding no taking had
occurred where landowner could still apply for and obtain a permit to build a single-family
dwelling); Stephans v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 697 F.Supp. 1149 (D. Nev. 1988)
(holding no taking had occurred where zoning restriction still permitted owner to use land
for single-family residences); Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 232

(1996) (holding no taking had occurred where federal wetlands regulations reduced plaintiff's
gross sales of land for residential development by 28%); Zerbetz v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 856 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1993) (holding no taking had occurred where designation
of property as "conservation wetlands" still permitted the landowner to apply for a
development permit); Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1996) (holding no
taking had occurred where landowner was still permitted to farm wetlands, which was the
existing use).
251. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1027 (1992).
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Thus, the Rehnquist approach does not always lead to the conclusion that
an unconstitutional taking has occurred.
b. Deciding What Constitutes Just Compensation
If the court finds the sending zone regulations do amount to an
unconstitutional taking, it must then determine what is just compensation.
The Supreme Court has interpreted "just compensation" to mean "the full
monetary equivalent of the property taken" that is based on the "fair
market value of [the] property at the time of the taking."2 The fair market
value is "to be ascertained from 'what a willing buyer would pay in cash
to a willing seller.""m Even though the Court has used terms like "monetary" in interpreting the just compensation clause, the Court has accepted
nonmonetary compensation in some contexts, as evidenced by the
"substitute-facilities" doctrine.' The constitutionality of using TDRs as a
form of compensation is not completely clear.' Some scholars feel such
use has been implicitly accepted in the federal context, even though the
Supreme Court has never actually decided the issue.' In Suitum, Justice
Scalia states his support for considering TDRs as a form of compensation
by writing, "[TDRs] may form a proper part, or indeed the entirety, of the
full compensation accorded a landowner when his property is taken."I

252. Alamota Farmers Elevator and Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470,473-74
(1973).

253. Id.at 474.
254. See United States v. 50 Acres of lAnd, 469 U.S 24,33 (1984). The "subsitute-facilities"
doctrine allows the federal government to compensate local or state governments with similar
facilities where the federal government has caused a taking and the state or local government
must replace the facility that was taken. Id.at 32-33.
255. See Kendall &Ryan, supra note 73, at 1837-43. Some state constitutions specifically
require that compensation be paid in money. See id. at 1842-43. TDRs considered under the
Rehnquist analysis are not doomed in this case. One way to operate a TDR program under
such restraints is through a TDR bank. The bank would buy and sell TDRs and in this way
could buy TDRs from landowners unwilling to voluntarily waive the right to monetary
compensation, thus side-stepping the problem.
256. See id. at 1841. See also Bradshaw, supra note 128, at 462-63; John J.Costonis, "Fair"
Compensation and the Aom tion Powr Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use
Controversies,75 COLUM. L REV. 1021 (1975).
257. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 750 (1997) (Scalia, I.,
concurring). But see Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 24-29, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 US. 725 (1997) (No. 96-243) (arguing
that allowing TDRs to serve as compensation will "inaugurate a whole host of other programs
to circumvent their obligation to pay compensation for either physical or regulatory takings").
The New York Supreme Court, in WJ.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S2d 1007 (N.Y. 1998)
supported Justice Scalia's proposition in dicta. After finding New York's Pine Barrens Act
constitutional on a facial challenge the court discussed Pine Barrens TDRs in light of Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Suitum. The court found Suitum distinguishable because the Pine
Barrens Act required condemnation/compensation by eminent domain or permission to
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Concern over using TDRs as compensation arises due to their uncertain

and speculative nature.2 However, such problems are best placed in the
just compensation portion of analysis, because the landowner is then
insured against potential bottoming-out of TDR prices. As long as TDRs are
factored into just compensation analysis, significant drops in TDR value
would require the government to supplement the TDRs with money
payments to fulfill the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. Under
Brennan's approach, there is no recourse for landowners if TDR values
drop substantially." As long as TDRs hold enough value to survive the
initial takings inquiry, the landowner will be wholly at the mercy of the
market for receiving adequate mitigation for their losses.'
Another concern when using TDRs as compensation is that
compensation is not being paid contemporaneously to the taking. In
Presault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, the Supreme Court has
addressed this issue in the context of transferring railroad right-of-ways to
public agencies under the National Trails System Act.' The Court stated
"the Fifth Amendment does not require that just compensation be paid in
advance of or even contemporaneously with the taking. All that is required
is the existence of a 'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for
obtaining compensation' at the time of the taking."' Thus, Presault

develop but suggested, in agreement with Justice Scalia, that "Pine Barrens TDRs may be
adequate compensation for the plaintiff's property [under the 5th Amendment]." W..F. Realty,
672 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
258. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 151-52 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
259. However, where TDRs have lost all or nearly all value the landowner may be able

to demonstrate a taking under the Brennan approach and the Rehnqulst approach would be

no better in this case. The Rehnqulst approach would be better, for example, where TDR price
has dropped 80%. In this case, the Brennan approach affords no protection because there is

still enough value in the TDRs to survive a takings challenge. The Rehnquist approach would
protect the landowner in this case because the Just Compensation Clause would force the
government to compensate the landowner for the 80% price drop with some form of
supplemental payment
260. An ancillary issue arises when one considers the case of the landowner that decides
to speculate on the price of TDRs and then when TDR prices have fallen brings a takings claim
alleging the deflated TDR price should be used in dimunition of value calculations. TDR
programs may survive such claims on an assumption of risk theory. If the landowner decides
to speculate on the TDR market, she assumes the risk that TDR prices will change to her
detriment. Therefore, a court could apply a TDR valuation method based on the price of TDRs
over time and how a reasonable investor would behave in the TDR market.
261. Presault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 US. 1,11 (1990).
262. National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1241 (1994).
263. Presault,494 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted) (quoting Regional Rail Reorganization
Cases, 419 U.S. 102,124-25 (1974)).
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strongly suggests that a guaranteed TDR market could be an acceptable
provision for obtaining compensation.'"
c. The Rehnquist Analysis Is Based on More Convincing Legal Theory and
Policy Concerns
The Rehnquist approach treats TDRs as compensation after a
taking has occurred, rather than making the theoretical leap of calling
TDRs an economic use of the land. Moreover, Rehnquist's approach also
protects landowners against potential crashes of TDR markets. In all
probability, the Rehnquist approach provides more protection from
unilateral state action than the Brennan approach.
The obvious concern associated with removing TDRs from the
takings analysis is that it will lead to a drastic reduction in the police
power, thus inhibiting the power of land planning agencies to protect
resources. However, this reduction may not be nearly as great as initially
thought and the benefits produced by it may quell any concerns. First, the
Rehnquist approach will force land planning agencies to seriously consider
proceeding under eminent domain power where the conservation value of
land is high enough to warrant total restriction of actual uses. Most
programs already incorporate some sort of government sponsored land
acquisition program into them as a fundamental element.26 Government
acquisitions are many times the more environmentally sound approach
because the land planning agencies may then encumber the land to
whatever degree they feel is necessary without worrying about retaining
some value in the land. This will more fully protect the valuable natural
resources contained in the land.
Second, placing TDRs on the just compensation side of the takings
issue assures maximization of the value of the TDRs. Where a denial of all
economically beneficial uses of land has occurred, TDR programs will be
required to provide full compensation to landowners. This acts as an added
incentive for TDR program designers to maximize TDR values and to fully
investigate supply and demand considerations before implementing TDR
programs. A TDR program that bases the allocation of rights and the
purchase requirements on a formula that is well-studied and tied to the
local value of development should pass or nearly pass just compensation

264. Assuming that nonmonetary compensation is found to be acceptable under the

Constitution.
265. See, e.g., Jung,supra note 59, at 60-63; MONTGOMERY COUNTY PLAN, supra note 42, at
39-40; Randle, supra note 52, at 197. TDR programs have many different types of funds
available to them. Conservation organizations, such as the Nature Conservancy and the Trust
for Public Land, could provide land acquisition funds for well-designed programs.
Additionally, government support is available from a variety of federal and state conservation
programs. See generallyWMDE r AL, supra note 44.
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tests without the need for much supplemental compensation. Only where
the TDR program is based on arbitrary or random formulas would the
program fail to come dose to achieving just compensation. This assures
that TDR programs are adequately researched and that landowners are not
arbitrarily or unnecessarily deprived of the economic value of their land.
Finally, by assuring landowners that their rights are being
protected, TDR programs will foster support and confidence from
participants. The courts will act as a backstop to assure landowners of fair
and equitable treatment. With such safety valves built into programs,
landowners will spend less time trying to get around the system and will
spend more time working with the system. Although the ad hoc, highly
factual nature of takings and just compensation analyses makes both
approaches subject to less than certain results, it is better to err on the side
of the private landowner when making a decision about which method of
analysis to apply.' After all, private landowners are really the only ones
that can make a private TDR market work. Thus, they deserve to enter the
marketplace with full confidence that their rights are being protected, and
that they are not being singled out to bear an undue portion of a price we
should all be willing to share.
In sum, the Rehnquist analysis has sounder theoretical justifications and is a better policy approach to the sending zone takings issue. The
Rehnquist approach treats TDRs as they theoretically should be treated-as
a form of compensation. This analysis is more sound from a policy
standpoint because it forces land planning agencies to more carefully use
eminent domain power, it maximizes market value of TDRs, and it assures
landowners that their rights are being protected. As a result, private
landowners' rights are more secure and they may enter TDR markets with
more confidence, reinforcing the market's integrity.
3. A Relic in the Storm?
When Penn Centralwas decided twenty years ago, little knowledge
of TDRs existed outside of the academic literature. The allocation of TDRs
to Penn Central presented a novel approach to alleviating the zoning
burden New York City had placed on a single company in the name of the
public good. The majority only uses one paragraph at the end of the

266. This is not an endorsement of private landowner rights at the exclusion of natural
resource protection. It is simply an acknowledgement that private market concepts will not
work where private parties do not support or trust them. If the end goal is a functional step
away from traditional zoning's command-and-control approach, then conservativism on the
side of private landowners is probably necessary to gain the cooperation and support from
them that is necessary to create successful market-based programs.
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opinion to address TDRs' and the dissent uses little more.' The TDR
scheme in Penn Central was relatively simple and did not involve any
external TDR "markets." The TDR scheme, a minor component of the
takings analysis, was treated almost as an afterthought to reinforce the
majority's conclusion that Penn Central had not suffered a taking.
The Court's cursory treatment of TDRs enticed land planners to
devise and establish more complex TDR schemes that could increase the
police power of planning agencies-a challenge which has been seized
upon and met. The TDR scheme in Suitum vividly demonstrates how much
modem day programs have evolved since Penn Central.Now, the Court is
being faced with more complicated TDR schemes and must decide just
how far land planners may extend the police power. Penn Central is a
sound decision when limited to its facts, but, as applied to modem TDR
programs, the opinion rests on a precarious foundation. Penn Centraldoes
not provide a convincing analysis for upholding modem TDR programs
and has left many land planners and landowners unsure of the constitutional footing of TDR programs. Consequently, it is imperative that the
Court reconsider Penn Central and provide a stronger constitutional
framework for TDRs. As argued in this article, the Rehnquist approach
appears to provide the better rationale to TDR treatment and it is urged
that the approach be adopted by the Court in the future. This will assure
prosperity and certainty in present and future TDR programs.
V. CONCLUSION
TDRs represent a new era in land management. They are a flexible
market-based tool that can help land planners overcome many of the
shortcomings associated with traditional zoning practices. However, TDRs
must be developed within the constitutional constraints of the Fifth
Amendment's takings clause. Since TDRs were first considered by the
Supreme Court twenty years ago, takings jurisprudence has changed
dramatically.
TDR programs may be divided into exactions and sending zone
restrictions for the purposes of constitutional takings analysis. Unconstitutional exactions claims are relatively rare, but are still a serious threat to
modem TDR programs, especially in light of two more recent Supreme
Court decisions limiting the government's power to require exactions. The
extent to which these decisions will affect TDR programs is not yet
completely dear, as courts have struggled in deciding how to apply the
Supreme Court's new limitations. What is clear is that TDR program

267. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,137 (1978).
268. See id. at 150-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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designers must be aware of these new constraints and be prepared to
design programs that either sidestep or fulfill the Court's new requirements.
Takings claims based on sending zone restrictions are more
common and courts use two very different types of analysis, outlined in the
majority and dissenting opinions to Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New
York City. The majority approach (the Brennan approach) treats TDRs as an
economic use of the land and factors their value into the takings calculus.
The dissenting approach (the Rehnquist approach) performs the takings
calculus independent of TDRs and only considers TDRs as a form of just
compensation where a taking has occurred. This approach was recently
endorsed by three Supreme Court Justices in a concurrence to Suitum v.
Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency. This article has argued that the Rehnquist
approach is the more convincing analysis and should be adopted by the
Court.
The abstract and complex nature of TDRs makes them susceptible
to several avenues of constitutional attack under the Takings Clause.
Courts consistently have had difficulty understanding and evaluating
TDRs and, as a result, the constitutionality of TDRs remains somewhat of
a mystery. In order for TDRs to weather the storm of takings jurisprudence, the Supreme Court must revisit the constitutional issues surrounding them and clarify the holding in Penn Centralusing an analysis that is
more consistent with the modem constitutional landscape.
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APPENDIX A. Examples of Active Transferable Development Rights
Programs.*
Location
Belmont,
CA

Purpose
Reduce or eliminate
development on steep slopes

Transfer Activity
Six transfers as of 1993

Burbank,
CA

Promote appropriate
concentration while
maintaining overall
development capacity within
limits of transportation and

Two transfers involving
over 400,000 sq. ft.

public service systems

Cupertino,
CA

Create flexible density
limitations to assist operation
of Traffic Intensity

Between 30 and 40 transfers

Performance Standard
regulation

Los Angeles,

Preserve historic structures,

Three projects approved

CA

promote housing, improve
transportation, and protect

involving 1,000,000 sq. ft.

Monterey

open space
Protect view corridors and

Transfers involve about 20

Co., CA

Big Sur

acres

Morgan, CA

Preserve open spaces

Oxnard, CA

Control beachfront
development
Site-specific

67 transfer credits involving
108.5 acres of hillside land
Transfers occurred between
1984 and 1988
One transfer involving 20

Pacifica, CA

acres

Pismo
Beach, CA
Placer Co.,
CA

Preserve open space

Roseville,
CA

Limit density of development
owned by developer wanting
to build a subdivision

Preserve open space

Preserve public access to
beach
Provides economic value to
property owners affected by
a 300-foot setback
requirement
Transfer rights between
parcels

'Table taken from Brief of the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the
United States, et al., at 14, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S.
725 (1997) (No. 96-243).
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APPENDIX A (continued)
Purpose
Location
Preserve historic structures
San Diego,
CA

Transfer Activity
At least two transfers
involving 5 to 10 residential
units
Approved in 1990

St. Mary's
Co., MD
Montgomery
Co., MD"
Pinelands,

Preserve farmland

NJ"

agricultural land

New York

Preserve historic landmarks

Credit Program has
protected over 13,000 acres
since 1979
About 12 transfers

Preserve environmentally-

Transfers involving 8.5

sensitive land

acres, with 158 credits
issued to 121 parcels

Preserve 127-year old church

Transfer involving 100,000

City, NY
Suffolk Co.

(Pine
Barrens),
NY
Westchester

Preserve farmland
Preserve open spaces and

4,881 rights transferred as
of July 1992
Pinelands Development

sq. ft.

Co., NY
Lancaster
Co., PA

Preserve farmland

Four TDRs transfe ed

Pittsburgh,
PA

Protect historic buildings and
arts facilities

Development rights
purchased and transferred

Austin, TX

Riverfront preservation

from two theaters

Used in revitalization of
Austin's Colorado River

promenade
Blacksburg,
VA
Pierce Co.,
WA
Seattle, WA
Portland, OR

Preserve open space,
farmland, and forest
Preserve farmland
Preserve historic theaters
Preserve and maintain singleoccupancy housing

_room

Adopted in 1996 to protect
Tom's Creek Basin
Covers 1,800 acres of
farmland
At least three transfers
Adopted in 1988 as part of
Central City Plan

"See MARYLAN>-NATnONAL CAPrTAL PARK AND PLAN. COMM'N, STATUS REPORTON
PROGRAm 8 (1992).
SMO', OMw
YCouwN TRANsFULE DEvELpRI

*See NEw JERSEY PNELANM

ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1996).

COMM'N, PROJEcTNG POIn

RESOURCES:1996
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APPENDIX B. State Statutes Approving the Use of Transferable
Development Rights.

State

Type of Resource Protected

Statutory Reference

Arizona

"[P]ublic health, safety and
general welfare"
"[Pireserve open space,
protect wildlife habitat and
critical areas, and enhance
and maintain the rural
character of lands with
contiguity to agricultural
lands suitable for long-range
farming and ranching

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9-462.01 .A. 12 (1997)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28401 (1998)

Colorado

operations"

Connecticut

Delaware

Florida

General zoning; provides for
inter-jurisdictional transfer of
rights
General zoning

Kansas

General zoning including
"protection of potable water
welfields" and "protection of
environmentally sensitive
lands"
"[Pjrotection, enhancement,
preservation, and use of
historic properties or burial
sites"
"[D]esignated historic
properties"
"[P]rotect potential
landmarks and preservation
districts"
General zoning

Kentucky

General zoning

Louisiana

General zoning

Hawaii

Idaho
Illinois

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2e
(1997)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§
2653(a)(3), 4953(aX3), &
6953(aX3).(1997)
FLA. STAT. ch.
XI.163.3202(3) (1997)

HAW. REV. STAT. § 6E-15
(1997)

IDAHO CODE § 67-4619
(1997)
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 55,
para. 5-30004(12) (1998)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12755(aX2) (1996)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
100.208 (Baldwin 1998)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
4722(B) (West 1998)
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APPENDIX B (continued)
Type of Resource Protected
State
"[E]ncourage the
Maryland
preservation of natural
resources and to facilitate
orderly growth and
development in the State"
General zoning with specific
Minnesota
reference to protecting
natural resources
General zoning
New
Hampshire
Pinelands protection
New Jersey
New York

New York

"[P]rotect, preserve and
properly manage the unique
resources of the Pine
Barrens-Peconic Bay system"

General zoning

New York

"[P]reservation of historic
landmarks and districts"

Pennsylvania

General zoning with specific
mention of "[p]rotection and
preservation of natural
resources and agricultural
land activities;" specifies that
TDRs may be used on a
"voluntary basis" only and
may not be tansferred
outside of originating
municipality
General zoning with specific
reference to protecting
natural resources and historic
landmarks

Rhode Island

Statutory Reference
MD. CODE ANN., CODE OF
1957, Art. 66B § 11.01
(1997)

MINN. STAT. § 394.25,
Subd. 2 (1997 Supp.)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
674:2 1(I)(d) (1996)
N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:55D113-29 (1998)
N.Y. ENvTh CONSERV.
LAW § 57-0105-21
(McKinney 1997)

N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20f (McKinney 1997); N.Y.
TOWN LAW § 261-a
(McKinney 1997); N.Y.
VILLAGE LAW § 7-701
(McKinney 1997)
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §
119-dd(5) (McKinney
1997)
53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
10603(c)(2.2), 10619.1, &
10702.1 (1998)

_

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-2433(B)(2) (1996)
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APPENDIX B (continued)

State
South Dakota

Type of Resource Protected
Historic properties

Statutory Reference
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ I-19B-26 (1997)

Tennessee

General zoning with specific
mention of natural resource
regulation; development
rights may only be
transferred by contract and

Tennessee

Regulation of special historic
districts and zones
General zoning with specific
mention of environmental
protection and historic

TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-7101(aX2) & 13-7-201(aX2)
(1997)

not by operation of law

Vermont

TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-7402(c) (1997)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §
4407(16) (1996)

landmark preservation

Washington

General zoning

WASH. REV. CODE §
36.70A.090 (1997)

